When Does Sacrificing the Present for the Future or Sacrificing the Future for the Present Enhance Satisfaction With Life? Implicit Theories of Change and Stability Moderate the Effects of Temporal Focus on Life Satisfaction. by Ward, Cindy L.
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Scholars Commons @ Laurier 
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 
2015 
When Does Sacrificing the Present for the Future or Sacrificing the 
Future for the Present Enhance Satisfaction With Life? Implicit 
Theories of Change and Stability Moderate the Effects of 
Temporal Focus on Life Satisfaction. 
Cindy L. Ward 
Wilfrid Laurier University, ward3710@mylaurier.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd 
 Part of the Social Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ward, Cindy L., "When Does Sacrificing the Present for the Future or Sacrificing the Future for the Present 
Enhance Satisfaction With Life? Implicit Theories of Change and Stability Moderate the Effects of 
Temporal Focus on Life Satisfaction." (2015). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1772. 
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1772 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ 
Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca. 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 1 
 
 
 
RUNNING HEAD: TEMPORAL FOCUS, IMPLICIT THEORIES AND LIFE 
SATISFACTION 
 
 
 
 
When Does Sacrificing the Present for the Future or Sacrificing the Future for the Present 
Enhance Satisfaction With Life? Implicit Theories of Change and Stability Moderate the Effects 
of Temporal Focus on Life Satisfaction. 
by 
Cindy L. P. Ward 
Bachelor of Arts, University of Waterloo, 2009 
Master of Arts - Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2011 
Submitted to the Department of Psychology/Faculty of Science 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
Doctor of Philosophy, Psychology 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
2015 
© Cindy L. P. Ward 2015 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 2 
 
Abstract 
In Western society we encounter contrasting prescriptions for how to live a happy life. Some 
argue the key to life satisfaction is living in the moment (e.g., seize the day), while others herald 
the importance of focusing on the future (e.g., pursuing goals, following one’s dreams). We 
suspect, however, that these prescriptions do not work the same for everyone. The goal of the 
present research is to examine whether the relation between temporal focus (focusing on a 
present versus future goal) and life satisfaction (LS) might be moderated by participants’ implicit 
theories of change and stability (Dweck, 1999). Incremental theorists believe that they can 
change with time and effort, whereas entity theorists believe their core attributes are relatively 
stable over time. We hypothesized that, because incremental theorists may feel more control over 
personal change and future outcomes, they may derive more immediate satisfaction from 
prioritizing future goals over present ones. In contrast, entity theorists may feel less certain about 
‘what may be’ in the future and are likely to feel more satisfied with life when pursuing more 
assured present rewards instead of striving for the unknown proceeds of the future. In Study 1, 
we examined these concepts correlationally. We measured willingness to sacrifice the present for 
the future, implicit theories and life satisfaction. We found that, as predicted, incremental 
theorists felt more LS when they endorsed a willingness to sacrifice the present for the future, 
whereas entity theorists felt more LS when they were less willing to sacrifice present goals for 
future ones. In Studies 2 and 3 we experimentally manipulated the tension between present and 
future focus. We asked participants to describe a recent decision where they either chose to 
pursue a future goal (over a present one) or they chose a present goal (over a future one) and then 
they indicated their overall satisfaction with life (e.g., Diener et al., 1984). Study 3 used a more 
controlled set of goals (spending and saving goals) and demonstrates that incremental theorists 
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were more satisfied when they chose to pursue the future goal over the present one whereas 
entity theorists showed the reverse pattern; but this effect only occurred among those with lower 
initial life satisfaction. In Study 4, we directly examined the relationship between implicit 
theories and feelings of personal control over future goals, a likely process variable. We found a 
significant relation between implicit theories and feelings of certainty of future goal attainment: 
incremental theorists were more certain about future goal attainment. Moreover, certainty about 
future goal attainment mediated the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction. In 
Study 5 we sought to manipulate this process variable (goal certainty) as part of establishing a 
causal link between feelings of future goal controllability and life satisfaction. We elicited 
feelings of perceived control (or lack of control) of a future goal outcome and found that 
participants were generally more satisfied when the future was made to feel controllable than 
when it was made to feel uncontrollable. Additional exploration of the data suggested that low-
LS entity theorists might still have difficulty deriving satisfaction even from controllable future 
goals. Overall, the findings suggest that implicit theories of change and stability importantly 
moderate the satisfaction in life that people may feel when deciding whether to live for today or 
sacrifice immediate gains to pursue their future. 
 
Keywords: implicit theories, life satisfaction, well-being, happiness, time perspective, self-
concordance, locus of control 
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Overview 
 In Aesop’s tale of moral virtue, The Ant and the Grasshopper, the ant worked all day 
socking away food for the winter whereas the grasshopper sang and danced all day long. When 
winter came, the ant had food and the grasshopper did not. The moral of the story is that success 
is achieved by planning for the future and should not be spent squandering time in frivolous 
pursuits, like singing and dancing and having a good time. Although humans are interested in 
achieving success, they also want to be satisfied with their life. The fable of The Ant and the 
Grasshopper suggests that success is achieved by focusing on the future, however, it does not 
tell us anything directly about ways to be satisfied with life. Although the story suggests that the 
grasshopper enjoyed his present-oriented hedonic activities, one cannot overlook the possibility 
that the ant was just as satisfied by working toward the future. Indeed, two people may differ 
dramatically in the types of activities that provide the basis for their evaluations of life 
satisfaction (Schimmack, Diener,& Oishi, 2002).This thesis examines how people’s implicit 
theories about personal change and stability may inform different routes to life satisfaction.  
What is Life Satisfaction? 
 We begin with a definition of life satisfaction (LS) as this construct is referred to in the 
literature. Diener and colleagues have found that life satisfaction is generally based on a person’s 
global assessment of their own of life ‘as a whole’ where people choose their own criteria of 
what is important (Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985). Subjective well-being is a 
conceptually different construct in that it includes people’s overall life satisfaction evaluations 
plus an affective component (positive emotions, such as joy and happiness, minus negative 
emotions, such as fear and sadness); (Diener, 1984). Without the affective component, life 
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satisfaction evaluations are thus referred to as cognitive, judgmental processes (Diener, Oishi, & 
Lucas, 2003).  
 Researchers have found that present mood can sometimes affect people’s reports of life 
satisfaction, however these effects are generally small and inconsistent (Eid & Diener, 2004). 
Overall, reports of life satisfaction can be relatively stable over time because if people rely on 
important life domains (which are often stable and chronic) when assessing their life satisfaction 
(Schimmack, Diener, & Oishi, 2002). However, people can also use temporarily accessible 
information such as a situation that is made salient when people are making their assessment 
(e.g., when the tragic fate of others is present). Typically, temporarily accessible information is 
only used when it is relevant to the person. For example, when the benefits of marriage are 
highlighted, this information may be pertinent to a married person when assessing their life 
satisfaction, but not to someone who is single (Schimmack et al., 2002). 
 In the literature on life satisfaction and well-being, there can be a great deal of overlap in 
the definitions of constructs such as happiness, well-being, and life satisfaction (Myers & Diener, 
1995). Additionally, there is cultural and historical variation on how these constructs have been 
and are thought about by lay people (Oishi, Graham, Kesebir, & Galinha, 2013). In the present 
research, we are primarily interested in capturing people’s global assessment of their life 
satisfaction, rather than changes in positive or negative affect. Thus, in the present thesis, we 
focus only on people’s evaluations of their overall satisfaction with life. 
Temporal Focus – Living in the Moment vs. Planning for the Future 
 Advice about whether to live one’s life with a present or future focus did not end with the 
story of The Ant and the Grasshopper. There are a number of popular, but contrasting adages in 
modern culture about the best way to achieve life satisfaction. For example, some might say that 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 14 
 
the best way to achieve a satisfied life is to live in the moment and seize every day. For example, 
Bill Watterson, the witty cartoonist of the Calvin and Hobbes series, stated “We’re so busy 
watching out for what’s just ahead of us that we don’t take time to enjoy where we are.” Albert 
Einstein’s quote “Past is dead; Future is uncertain; Present is all you have, so eat, drink and live 
merry,” is highly circulated on the internet as is a quote by the great American poet Walt 
Whitman, who said “Happiness is, not in another place but this place...not for another hour, but 
this hour.” 
 On the other hand, there is camp suggesting the complete opposite: that the best way to 
achieve a satisfied life is to work for a better future and to never stop believing in your dreams. 
For example, Stephen Covey, acclaimed author and leadership trainer stated in his book, The 7 
Habits of Highly Effective People, “Happiness (is) - in part at least - the fruit of the desire and 
ability to sacrifice what we want now for what we want eventually.” Ezra Taft Benson, religious 
leader and political figure during the 20th century has popularized the quote “Years of happiness 
can be lost in the foolish gratification of a momentary desire for pleasure.”  And popular 
sportscaster, Erin Andrews, is known for her inspirational quotes including “Success doesn't 
happen overnight. Keep your eye on the prize and don't look back.” 
Because it is often hard to satisfy both present and future goals at the same time, there 
can be a struggle in determining which prescription to follow. Two people can differ in the types 
of activities that provide the basis for their evaluations of life satisfaction (Schimmack et al., 
2002). First, we examine each of these prescriptions individually, and then consider the kind of 
person who might thrive in each context.   
 Live in the moment. One person may value and find pleasure in everyday activities such 
as savoring good meals, spending time with loved ones, or working on a creative endeavor (e.g., 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 15 
 
painting and sculpture). These examples suggest a type of “living in the moment.” Research has 
found that living in the moment is an orientation toward present pleasure (Sobol-Kwapinska, 
2013) which is sometimes referred to as hedonism (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Although some 
cultural representations of hedonism depict people engaging in activities such as sex, drugs and 
rock-and-roll, present-oriented activities need not be so lavish - or risky. Indeed, general present-
oriented activities, such as stopping to smell the roses, often result in positive emotions (Brown 
& Ryan, 2003; Sobol-Kwapinska, 2013) which can often lead to feelings of higher life 
satisfaction in general (Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). Additionally, research has found that 
people enjoy themselves more when they are absorbed in mindful challenge (e.g., immersed in a 
project), or engaged in meaningful work (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Thus it seems as if a present-
focus can be very fulfilling and that some people might feel great life satisfaction with this 
temporal focus. The downside to present orientation is that with less regard for the future, people 
may have less defined future goals and may not plan appropriately for important future situations 
such as academic testing and career goals (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Overall though, present 
orientation can have many positive benefits (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Sobol-Kwapinska, 2013). 
Zimbardo & Boyd (1999) found that present-oriented participants were highly energetic and 
savored personal relationships. 
 Plan for the future. Another person may find little satisfaction in moment to moment 
situations, but rather instead, find pleasure and deep satisfaction in working toward some future 
goal; like planning a vacation or working toward a job promotion. These examples suggest a type 
of “future orientation.” Thinking about ‘what may be’ in the future can be very fulfilling because 
people tend to focus on only the positive aspects of the future and overlook any potential 
negative aspects (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003). This type of positivity 
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bias towards the future has been shown to increase people’s perceptions of their overall life 
satisfaction, particularly when they are engaged in striving toward a future goal (Diener, 1984; 
Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001). The downside to future-orientation is that working toward future 
goals often means forgoing pleasure in the moment. For example, future-oriented students 
indicated that having high ambitions for their careers meant that they had no time to “waste” 
hanging out with friends; they were quite happily willing to sacrifice present enjoyment to 
achieve their career objectives (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Overall, though, future orientation has 
been found to be related to many positive consequences for individuals in Western society such 
as higher socioeconomic status and superior academic achievement (Teahan, 1958; Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999). Thus it seems as if a future orientation can also be very fulfilling and that some 
people might feel great life satisfaction with this temporal focus. 
 You can’t have your cake and eat it too – the tension between present and future 
goals. It can be very difficult to satisfy both a future goal and a present goal at the same time. 
Thus, there is often a natural tension between the two choices where one type of goal may need 
to be sacrificed over the other (Emmons, 1986). As noted above, students with high career 
ambitions may end up sacrificing social friendships in the present in order to devote the time it 
takes to achieve the successful outcomes they desire in the future. In contrast, people who prefer 
to relish the time they spend with friends may end up sacrificing work projects and other career-
focused goals. 
 Where a balanced time perspective is most likely the best strategy for psychological well-
being (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), chronic time perspectives don’t preclude the fact that everyone 
encounters situations where they are faced with making a choice between a present desire and a 
future desire (Emmons, 1986). Although virtually everyone pursues both goal types at one time 
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or another (Harber, Zimbardo, & Boyd, 2003), we thought that some people might derive more 
pleasure from one type of goal pursuit over the other.  
Temporal Focus and Life Satisfaction: Implicit theories of Change and Stability may 
Moderate the Relationship. 
 People generally have both present goals and future goals (Harber et al., 2003). However, 
this does not mean that everyone derives similar satisfaction from pursuing these goals. Let us 
imagine, for example, a person working toward an ultimate future goal of owning a successful 
business. In the service of this future goal, she must sacrifice many current pleasures. One might 
wonder if such a state of affairs is satisfying or joyless to the pursuer. It may have to do with her 
belief in her ability to achieve the future goal. If this business-owner is confident that the 
business will succeed, then it may be possible that sacrificing present rewards may not seem very 
challenging given the future success that she anticipates. However, if the future success of her 
businesses does not seem likely or guaranteed, then every present reward that she sacrifices 
might feel like a possible wasted pleasure in the service of something that might not even come 
to pass.  
So, who might derive pleasure from sacrificing the present for the future? We suspect 
that incremental theorists, who tend to feel more control over future outcomes (Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995a), may feel more satisfied with life when they put their eggs into their future basket, 
particularly if they feel like success is likely. A future focus is culturally valued (Spears, Lin, & 
Mowen, 2001), and, when a person feels optimistic that such a future may actually come to pass, 
they may feel greater life satisfaction in the present in anticipation of these future rewards 
(Carver, Lawerence, & Scheier, 1996). In contrast, we suspect that entity theorists, who may feel 
less control over future outcomes (Dweck et al., 1995a) may prefer to concentrate on present 
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(more certain) outcomes rather than future outcomes that may never come to fruition. We 
elaborate on this further below. 
Implicit Theories of Personal Malleability 
Implicit theories constitute influential top-down belief systems that are often found to be 
stable individual differences among people and strong predictors of behavior (Dweck et al., 
1995a). Individual differences in perspective play a pivotal role in how people approach and 
interpret the world (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009), and 
accordingly, may have major implications for life satisfaction. 
Research on implicit theories of stability and change suggests that people differ in their 
assumptions about the nature and malleability of human qualities and that these theories function 
like knowledge structures (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b; Plaks et 
al., 2009) such that people regularly lean toward using one theory over the other as a lens 
through which they interpret themselves and the world around them. Entity theorists believe that 
personality characteristics are fixed and stable (e.g., a leopard never changes its spots), whereas 
incremental theorists believe that personality characteristics are malleable and can be developed 
with time and effort (e.g., turn over a new leaf). Implicit theories have been extensively studied 
as a cognitive construct for their effects on motivation (Dweck, 1999), learning (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988), and person perception (Plaks et al., 2009), but relatively little is known about 
their contribution to well-being and life satisfaction. 
Intelligence Domain. The first work in implicit theories research began in the 
intelligence domain with a substantial focus on school aged children. Dweck and colleagues 
found consistent evidence that when children believed their traits were fixed and stable they 
responded with helpless reactions to achievement setbacks, blaming internal stable dispositions 
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for failure. In contrast, children who believed their traits were malleable responded to difficulties 
and setbacks with learning goals and mastery oriented behavior citing reasons for failure as a 
lack of effort (Dweck, 1999). Thus, implicit theories are argued to be a basis for the attributions 
people make (Dweck et al., 1995a, Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999).  
Considerable evidence has been found that incremental theorists pursue learning goals 
(Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack & Finkel, 2013; Dweck & Leggett, 1988); they feel 
intelligent when they can master difficult problems, and believe that most of what contributes to 
intelligence is effort (rather than sheer ability). In earlier work, Dweck et al, (1995a) found a 
modest, but significant association between internal locus of control (Levenson, 1974) and 
implicit theories of intelligence (β = .15) suggesting that incremental theorists feel more 
confident than entity theorists in making their plans work and actively determining what will 
happen in their life. After failure, incremental theorists tend to focus on increased effort and 
remedial strategies to increase their chances of success (Dweck, 1999). Corroborating these 
earlier findings, recent work in the self-regulation literature has found that in the domain of 
dieting and weight management, incremental theorists felt less doubt and more confidence about 
attaining their dieting goals which then led them to exert more effortful regulation in pursuit of 
the goal (Burnette, 2010). Furthermore, a meta-analysis covering an age range from age 5 – 42, 
primarily focused on the learning, performance and achievement domains, found that 
incremental theorists have higher expectations of goal success than entity theorists and tend to 
develop more self-control because they engage in learning opportunities (even though these 
opportunities require extra effort) which in turn strengthens self-regulation abilities (Burnette et 
al., 2013). Although less is known about these relationships outside of the academic, learning 
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and achievement domains, it is possible that incremental theorists may feel a stronger sense of 
personal control over future outcomes more generally – more so than entity theorists.  
Because entity theorists tend to think in terms of dispositional traits and ‘how much’ of a 
trait they or someone might possess (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997) they tend to seek out 
performance goals – situations where they can show off their traits and validate themselves 
(Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Entity theorists feel intelligent when the work seems 
easy, and believe that most of what contributes to intelligence is an innate ability that one is born 
with (Dweck, 1999). In the intelligence domain, entity theorists tend to believe that if they have 
to work hard at something it is evidence that they don’t have a high ability (Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). Additionally, when faced with failures, entity theorists have been shown to give up and 
not seek remedial action – a helpless response (Burnette et al., 2013; Hong et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, because an ability such as intelligence is a vague construct it is hard to know for 
certain if one ever has enough of it; entity theorists tend to constantly seek reflections of their 
abilities in their performance (to reassure themselves they have a sufficient amount). In general, 
entity theorists tend to experience more negative emotions (than incremental theorists) during 
goal pursuit and have less optimistic expectations about their ability to achieve their goals. 
Results from a meta-analysis conducted by Burnette et al. (2013) found significant correlations 
between implicit theories and negative emotions (r = -.32) and implicit theories and optimistic 
expectations of success (r = .41) during goal monitoring.  
Because entity theorists tend to feel less internal control over future outcomes (Dweck, 
1995a), experience negative emotions during goal pursuit and are less optimistic about goal 
outcomes, the entity theory system tends to breed uncertainty (Dweck et al., 1995b) and leads to 
fewer and less successful self-regulation strategies (Burnette et al., 2013). 
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General Person Domain. Additional research has shown that implicit theories affect 
people’s social information processing; entity theorists tend to make dispositional attributions 
about others’ behavior whereas incremental theorists tend to consider more dynamic elements of 
the person within situation (Dweck et al., 1995a; McConnell, 2001; Molden, Plaks, & Dweck, 
2006). Furthermore, implicit theories have also been found to have powerful effects on 
motivation and self-regulation strategies (Ommundsen, 2003; Dweck, 1999; Burnette et al., 
2013), relationship communication strategies (Kammrath & Dweck, 2006), and other outcomes 
such as stereotype formation (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998) and punitive judgments of 
criminal offenders (Tam, Shu, Ng, & Tong, 2013).  
Who is more satisfied with their life?  
Despite the large literature on the effects of implicit theories of change and stability on 
social cognition, surprisingly little research has been done in the domain of implicit theories and 
the “self-concept” beyond the domain of intelligence. For instance, not much is known about the 
relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction. For example, are there any 
differences in life satisfaction between incremental and entity theorists? Is one group happier 
than the other?  
A substantial amount of research has consistently found a strong link between self-esteem 
and life satisfaction (Myers & Diener, 1995). As Myers and Diener (1995) say, “Happy people 
like themselves.” Research to date, however, has not found a relationship between implicit 
theories and self-esteem (Dweck et al., 1995a; Hong et al., 1999), or perhaps a weak relationship 
with incremental theory (Diseth, Meland, & Breidablik, 2014). In their seminal paper, Dweck 
and Leggett (1988) suggested that entity and incremental theorists differ in the processes by 
which they maintain self-esteem, where entity theorists feed off of performance outcomes and 
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incremental theorists relish learning and mastery – both of which can lead to high self-esteem. 
Thus, based on the literature to date, there is no clear reason to believe that entity theorists would 
differ from incremental theorists, on average, on their life satisfaction.  
Although we do not have any theoretical reasons to believe that incremental theorists are 
more satisfied with their lives than entity theorists or vice versa, people with these theories 
approach the world differently and possibly use differing strategies to achieve similar ends (e.g., 
self-esteem, positive self-regard). For example, differences can be seen in the self-enhancement 
strategies that are used. Whereas incremental theorists tend to downplay past selves as a means 
for seeing improvement in the present (e.g., “that was the old me, whereas the new me has 
improved”), entity theorists tend to enhance past selves for the same purpose (i.e., as a means for 
creating positive regard in the present) (Ward & Wilson, 2015). Thus, we speculate that because 
of these differences in perspective, incremental and entity theorists might derive life satisfaction 
from different contexts. For the purposes of the present research, we were interested in how 
entity and incremental theorists might respond to alternative goal pursuit strategies: specifically, 
focusing on the future (while sacrificing the present) versus focusing on the present (while 
sacrificing the future).  
Overview of the Present Studies 
The goal of the present research is to examine whether the relation between temporal 
focus (focusing on a present versus future goal) and life satisfaction (LS) might be moderated by 
participants’ implicit theories of change and stability (Dweck, 1999). Incremental theorists 
believe that they can change with time and effort, whereas entity theorists believe their core 
attributes are relatively stable over time. We hypothesize that, because incremental theorists may 
feel more control over personal change and future outcomes, they may derive more immediate 
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satisfaction from prioritizing future goals over present ones. In contrast, entity theorists may feel 
less certain about ‘what may be’ in the future and are likely to feel more satisfied with life when 
pursuing more assured present rewards instead of striving for the proceeds of an unknown future. 
In Study 1, we examine these concepts correlationally. In Studies 2 and 3 we experimentally 
manipulate the tension between present and future focus. We ask participants to describe a recent 
decision where they either chose to pursue a future goal (over a present one) or they chose a 
present goal (over a future one) and then indicate their overall satisfaction with life (e.g., Diener, 
1984). We hypothesize that incremental theorists will be more satisfied when they choose to 
pursue a future goal over a present one whereas entity theorists are likely to be more satisfied 
when they pursue a present goal over a future one. In Study 4, we examine a likely process 
variable: feelings of personal control over the future. We test the hypothesis that incremental 
theorists might feel more control/certainty over their future outcomes than entity theorists. 
Finally, in Study 5, we explicitly manipulate felt controllability with respect to future goals as 
part of establishing a link between implicit theories, feelings of future goal certainty and life 
satisfaction as suggested by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005). We hypothesize that when 
controllability of future outcomes is emphasized, participants will indicate higher satisfaction 
with life than when uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized. 
Study 1 
 The goal of Study 1 was to examine if the relationship between one’s willingness to 
sacrifice the present for the future and life satisfaction might be moderated by participants’ 
implicit theories of personality.  
 Evidence suggests that incremental theorists are optimistic about changing in desired 
ways (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and feel a locus of control over personal outcomes (Dweck et al., 
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1995a). Thus, we expected that incremental theorists might be most satisfied with life when 
focused on, or generally oriented toward, future-planning. In contrast, entity theorists tend to 
endorse a stable conception of ability and are not particularly optimistic about improving their 
ability and skill level even if they try harder (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Thus, it was expected 
that entity theorists might be most satisfied with life when they place importance on (more 
certain) present enjoyment over future goals that they may be less confident they can attain.  
 The first study explores these questions correlationally. We hypothesized that 
incremental theorists would not differ substantially from entity theorists on overall life 
satisfaction. However, we suspected that incremental theorists would report the greatest amount 
of life satisfaction when they endorsed a future-focus (i.e., sacrificing present rewards for future 
goals) and that entity theorists would report the greatest amount of life satisfaction when they 
endorsed a present-focus (i.e., focused on enjoying life in the present rather than planning for the 
future). Finally, we measured additional variables for analysis to ensure that that the effects we 
find are not explained by other plausible constructs (e.g., regulatory focus, Higgins, 1997; time 
perspective, Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). 
Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and twelve participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Nine participants failed one or both attention checks and were eliminated from all analyses 
leaving 203 participants (Mage = 35.74, SD = 12.68; 111 female, 89 male, 3 undisclosed). 
Because no gender effects were found in any study, gender is not included in the analyses 
reported. 
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Measures 
 Life Satisfaction. Participants rated their overall satisfaction with life using a 
standardized one-item measure commonly used in national polls throughout OECD nations (i.e., 
member nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (Helliwell, 
Layard, & Sachs, 2012). On a scale ranging from 0(extremely dissatisfied) to 10(extremely 
satisfied) participants rated their level of agreement with the following statement: “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Higher numbers indicate 
more favourable evaluations. The means and standard deviations of all measures are reported in 
Table 1. 
 Implicit theories. Implicit theories are described as the naive personal beliefs people 
hold about the nature and malleability of human attributes (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et 
al., 1995a). Researchers typically use the terms incremental theorists and entity theorists to refer 
to groups of people with different dominant lay theories. Incremental theorists endorse beliefs 
about personal change (i.e., believe people can change their basic attributes and personalities), 
whereas entity theorists typically endorse personal stability (i.e., believe that people’s attributes 
and personalities are fixed and stable). We adapted the general measure of implicit theories 
Dweck (1999) to measure participants’ implicit theory of personality (see Appendix A). On a 
Likert scale with end-points anchored at 1(strongly disagree) and 7(strongly agree), participants 
indicated their agreement with two statements: “People can’t change the kind of person they are; 
no matter what  they do, their fundamental attributes stay the same,” and “A person’s basic 
characteristics and traits can’t be changed very  much, no matter how hard they try.” Higher 
numbers indicate a general endorsement of the entity theory of personality (i.e., the belief that 
characteristics and personality traits are fixed and not likely to change). Both items are then 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 26 
 
reverse scored which provides an overall score where high numbers indicate the incremental 
theory perspective and low numbers indicate the entity theory perspective. A composite score 
was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of personality (Cronbach’s α = .83). It is 
worth mentioning that although the items did not offer participants the opportunity to endorse the 
incremental theory directly Dweck and colleagues have substantial evidence indicating that those 
who disagree with the entity theory also directly endorse the incremental theory (Dweck et al., 
1995a; Dweck, et al., 1995b). 
 Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. We used a 4-item measure 
developed by Hayes, Ward, and McGregor (2015) designed to capture the degree to which 
participants are willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present in order to reap future rewards (α = 
.79). On a Likert scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants rated 
the extent to which they agreed with four statements: “It is more important for me to enjoy life 
now than plan for the future;” [reverse scored], “I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present 
because I know that it will bring me more rewards in the future,” “I am afraid that if I sacrifice 
pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things that life has to offer;” [R], and “I 
want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result;” [R]. Higher composite 
scores on this scale indicate a greater importance placed on reaping future goals over attaining 
present rewards. Lower composite scores represent the reverse: A greater importance placed on 
attaining present rewards over reaping future benefits. 
 Regulatory focus. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) describes two distinct types 
of achievement motivation toward a desired outcome. Promotion focus describes a motivational 
style focused on hopes and accomplishments resulting in eager approach motivation. In contrast, 
prevention focus describes a motivational style focused on safety and responsibilities resulting in 
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vigilant approach motivation. Regulatory focus is not part of our a priori hypothesis however, it 
seemed prudent to examine it in relation to the variables of interest for the following reasons. 
First, promotion orientation is often found to be positively correlated with subjective well-being, 
particularly in Western nations (Fulmer et al., 2010). Additionally, regulatory focus (promotion 
orientation) is linked to a general openness to change as part of an advancement and growth 
process (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). Finally, the concept of promotion focus - 
orienting toward future goals - may also be deemed as conceptually similar to sacrificing present 
rewards for the future. Thus, we measured regulatory focus to allow us to examine whether 
prevention and promotion orientations were alternate explanations for the effects of our 
hypothesized variables.  Regulatory focus was measured using the 11-item regulatory focus 
questionnaire (RFQ: Higgins et al., 2001). On a Likert scale ranging from 1(never or seldom) to 
5(very often), the questions ask how frequently certain events have occurred in a person’s life. 
Six items capture promotion focus (e.g., Do you often do well at different things that you try? 
Cronbach’s α = .64), and five items capture prevention focus (e.g., How often did you obey rules 
and regulations that were established by your parents? Cronbach’s α = .87). 
 Time Perspective. The Zimbardo time perspective inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 
1999) was used to assess individual differences in temporal orientation. This orientation (or bias) 
is also described as a learned and habitual pattern of using temporal categories or time frames to 
process personal and social experiences. While some people might have a balanced or flexible 
time orientation with the ability to switch temporal frames among the past, present, and future, 
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) suggest that time perspectives are typically stable individual 
differences: Some people are chronically more future-oriented, others more present or past 
oriented, etc. Because one’s willingness to sacrifice the present for the future naturally involves 
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the tension between two temporal perspectives (present and future), Zimbardo and Boyd’s time 
perspective scale was used in the present study to help us to further assess and explain the 
predicted effects related to willingness to sacrifice. The 56 item ZTPI comprise five subscales1 
(as ranged from .77 to .87). Items (e.g., ‘‘I’ve made mistakes in the past that I wish I could 
undo;’’[past negative], ‘‘I get nostalgic about my childhood;’’ [past positive], “I complete 
projects on time by making steady progress;’’ [future],‘‘Since whatever will be will be, it doesn’t 
really matter what I do;’’ [present-fatalistic], and, ‘‘I take risks to put excitement in my life;’’ 
[present hedonistic], were rated on a Likert scale from 1(very uncharacteristic of me) to 5(very 
characteristic of me). Of primary interest are future orientation and present hedonistic 
orientation, as these orientations each represent one component of willingness to sacrifice (a 
future orientation, at the expense of present hedonism and vice versa). In addition, a present 
fatalistic orientation might zero in on some of the hypothesized differences in how entity and 
incremental theorists think about their ability to control and influence the future.   
Procedure 
 Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 30 minute session. After 
the demographics section, participants were first asked to indicate their level of life satisfaction. 
Then participants completed the adapted measure of personality implicit theories (Dweck, 1999). 
Next, participants completed a number of tasks unrelated to the present study: the degree to 
which participants’ needs are met (e.g., Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 1943) and the degree to 
which participants obtain information about happiness from a variety of sources (e.g., friends, 
social media, television, and the internet). Finally, participants completed the dependent 
                                                 
1 A principal components varimax rotation factor analysis was conducted on the ZTIP. The fixed five-factor solution 
that was extracted replicated Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) findings. 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 29 
 
measures. Means and standard deviations of all of the variables in the study are presented in 
Table 1; Intercorrelations are presented in Table 2. 
Results and Discussion 
 According to our hypothesis, the question of interest was whether the relationship 
between one’s willingness to sacrifice the present for the future and life satisfaction might be 
moderated by participants’ implicit theories of personality. 
Central Analyses 
Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship between Willingness to Sacrifice the 
Present for the Future and Life Satisfaction? 
 Because our research design included two continuous variables (implicit theories and 
willingness to sacrifice), we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the 
implicit theory x willingness to sacrifice interaction term as a predictor of life satisfaction. We 
entered life satisfaction as the criterion variable. Then, we centered both continuous independent 
variables (IVs), whereby the mean is subtracted from each score to yield a mean score of zero, as 
recommended by Aiken and West (1991); and entered both IVs in Step 2. In Step 3, we entered 
the interaction term: Implicit theory x willingness to sacrifice.  
 As predicted, we found a significant interaction (see Figure 1); b = .211, β = .201, p = 
.004, 95% CI = [.07, .36] that suggests that implicit theories of personality moderates the 
relationship between willingness to sacrifice the present for the future and life satisfaction (see 
Table 3 for β and t values for all predictor variables). No main effects for either willingness to 
sacrifice (β = -.01, p = .87) or implicit theories (β = -.02, p = .74) emerged. 
 Next, we examined the interaction pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple 
slopes at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the implicit theories 
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variable. We expected that incremental theorists might report higher life satisfaction when they 
also prioritize future over present goals (i.e., as reflected in a high willingness to sacrifice present 
rewards in pursuit of future goals), whereas entity theorists might report higher life satisfaction 
when they are less willing to sacrifice present rewards (i.e., focused on enjoying life in the 
present rather than sacrificing now for the future). As expected, incremental theorists, defined at 
1 SD above the mean, were marginally more satisfied with life when they were more willing (vs. 
less willing) to sacrifice the present for the future; b = .28, β = .16, p = .088, 95% CI = [-.04, 
.61].  In contrast, entity theorists, defined at one SD below the mean, were significantly more 
satisfied with life when they were less willing (vs. more willing) to sacrifice the present for the 
future; b = -.37, β = -.20, p = .04, 95% CI = [-.72, -.02]. Additionally, examination of the simple 
slopes at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the willingness to sacrifice 
variable revealed that incremental theorists are marginally more satisfied with their life than 
entity theorists when high on willingness to sacrifice for the future; b = .25, β = .17, p = .09, 95% 
CI = [-.04, .54], whereas entity theorists are significantly more satisfied with their life than their 
incremental counterparts when they are low on willingness to sacrifice for the future; b = -.29, β 
= -.19, p = .036, 95% CI = [-.55, -.02]. 
Supplemental Analyses 
Is Regulatory Focus an Alternative Explanation for the Effects on Life Satisfaction? 
 To rule out the possibility that regulatory focus may be the true construct of interest in 
these interactions, two analysis strategies were employed. Using the same regression analysis 
approach as above, we first examined regulatory focus as a potential proxy for implicit theories 
(that is, we replaced implicit theories with promotion focus in the model), and then we examined 
regulatory focus as a potential proxy for willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. 
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Promotion focus, an eager approach style, and prevention focus, a vigilant approach style, were 
both tested. For the first two steps we ran four regressions allowing us to test the interaction 
terms as predictors of subjective life satisfaction: promotion x willingness to sacrifice, prevention 
x willingness to sacrifice, promotion x implicit theories, and, prevention x implicit theories. 
 Regulatory focus as a potential proxy for implicit theories. When the two sub-scales 
of regulatory focus were substituted for implicit theories of personality in the main regression 
analysis, neither the interaction of willingness to sacrifice with promotion nor the interaction of 
willingness to sacrifice with prevention emerged significant (t’s < 1.16, p’s > .25). β and t values 
for all predictor variables across each of the four analyses can be found in Tables 4 through 7. 
Consistent with past research, promotion orientation was significantly correlated with life 
satisfaction; r(203) = .54, p < .001, and thus emerged as a significant main effect throughout the 
regression analyses in Study 1. Prevention orientation was not correlated with life satisfaction; 
r(203) = .07, p = .32. 
 Regulatory focus as a potential proxy for willingness to sacrifice the present for the 
future. When the two sub-scales of regulatory focus were substituted for the willingness to 
sacrifice variable in the main regression analysis, the interaction with prevention orientation was 
non-significant; b = .074, β = .05, p = .45, 95% CI = [-.12, .27]. Upon examination of the 
implicit theories x promotion orientation analysis, both a main effect of promotion and a main 
effect of implicit theories were significant. However, these main effects were qualified by a 
marginal interaction; b = .22, β = .11, p = .067, 95% CI = [-.02, .46] (see Figure 2). In line with 
our exploratory approach to conceptually related constructs, we took a closer look at this 
interaction pattern and examined simple effects at -1SD and +1SD for both of these continuous 
variables. Both incremental and entity theorists were more satisfied with life when high (versus 
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low) in promotion orientation; β’s > .47, p’s < .001. Of particular note, entity theorists were just 
as satisfied with life as incremental theorists when high in promotion orientation (1 SD above the 
mean); p = .61, whereas, low promotion orientation (1 SD below the mean) seemed to be linked 
to lower satisfaction for incremental theorists. Incremental theorists were significantly less 
satisfied with life than entity theorists when low in promotion orientation; b = -.35, β = -.24, p = 
.004, 95% CI = [-.59, -.11]. Overall, it appears as if entity theorists are just as satisfied with life 
as incremental theorists when they are high in eager approach motivation (i.e., promotion). In 
contrast, low promotion orientation (i.e., low in eager approach motivation) was generally 
associated with lower life satisfaction, but in particular, incremental theorists were significantly 
less satisfied in this state. 
 Lastly, in order to rule out regulatory focus accounting for our predicted interaction 
between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future, we re-ran our 
initial regression analysis with implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the 
future as well as prevention, promotion and all higher order interaction terms. As expected, the 
predicted interaction between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice remained significant; 
b = .25, β = .24, p < .001, 95% CI = [.13, .37]; (see Table 8 for β and t values for all predictor 
variables). 
Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship between Time Perspective and Life 
Satisfaction? 
 Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) time perspective scale was used in the present study to 
provide additional explanatory power for disentangling the dual temporal nature of sacrificing 
the present for the future for entity and incremental theorists. For example, we found that 
incremental theorists are most satisfied with life when they sacrifice the present for potential 
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future rewards and that entity theorists are most satisfied with life when they do not. So, does 
this mean that incremental theorists do not enjoy the present, or that entity theorists take no 
pleasure in planning for the future? We speculate that it is the tension between having to 
prioritize a future goal by sacrificing present enjoyment that truly captures the psychological 
struggle experienced by incremental and entity theorists. However, by examining the present 
hedonic and future time perspective subscales we are able to tease apart the built-in tension 
between present and future in the willingness to sacrifice variable and answer some of these 
important questions.  
 Because the willingness to sacrifice has both a present and future component, we looked 
at these two components separately by examining the two most closely corresponding temporal 
orientations – present hedonism and future orientation. We suspect that the effect of willingness 
to sacrifice has to do with the tension between a present and future goal – but it could be that all 
of the action really centers around people’s responses to a present focus, or to a future focus. 
Perhaps incremental theorists are unhappy about present hedonism, for instance, or perhaps 
entity theorists dislike a future focus state. Examining these separate scales allows us to 
disentangle these two possibilities and compare findings to those for willingness to sacrifice, 
which (unlike either time orientation) directly pits present goals against future goals.  
 In addition, present fatalism could be of some relevance to examine because it is tied to 
our theorized explanation. Specifically, we expect that entity theorists might feel less control 
over future outcomes, hence having a higher fatalistic perspective (what will be, will be). 
However we also thought it plausible that entity theorists would not find present fatalism to be 
unpleasant, whereas incremental theorists might find it more dissatisfying to have that viewpoint.  
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 Present hedonic time perspective. Present hedonism is moderately correlated with life 
satisfaction; r(203) = .21, p = .002. It is possible that implicit theories might moderate this 
relationship. To test this, we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the 
implicit theory x present hedonic interaction term as a predictor of life satisfaction. Again, we 
entered life satisfaction as the criterion variable and entered both centered IVs in Step 2. In Step 
3, we entered the interaction term: Implicit theory x present hedonism. In Step 1, we controlled 
for the other four time perspectives: past positive, past negative, present fatalistic, and present 
hedonic as all five time perspectives are intercorrelated (see Table 2). 
 We found a significant interaction (see Figure 3); b = -.24, β = -.12, p = .028, 95% CI = [-
.46, -.03] that suggests that implicit theories moderates the relationship between present 
hedonism and life satisfaction (see Table 9 for β and t values for all predictor variables). Next, 
we examined the interaction pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple effects at -
1SD and +1SD for both the implicit theories variable and the present hedonism variable. Life 
Satisfaction did not differ between incremental and entity when low in present hedonism; p = 
.92. Although incremental theorists were less satisfied with life than entity theorists when highly 
hedonistic; b = -.36, β = -.24, p = .002, 95% CI = [-.28, -.13], both entity theorists (b = 1.39, β = 
.43, p < .001, 95% CI = [.88, 1.91]) and incremental theorists (b = .65, β = .20, p = .016, 95% CI 
= [.12, 1.17]) were significantly more satisfied when high in present hedonism than when low in 
present hedonism. Thus, it seems as if both entity theorists and incremental theorists may benefit 
from a present hedonic temporal perspective; and entity theorists to a somewhat greater degree. 
 Future time perspective. Future orientation is moderately correlated with life 
satisfaction; r(203) = .22, p = .001. It is possible that implicit theories might moderate this 
relationship. To test this, we conducted the same multiple regression analyses as above, 
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controlling for the other four time perspectives, to investigate implicit theories x future 
orientation. The interaction did not emerge as significant; b = .12, β = .05, p = .36 (see Figure 4 
and Table 10 for β and t values for all predictor variables). However, given that we are interested 
in exploring future orientation as a variable that may provide explanatory information for entity 
and incremental theorists, we went ahead and broke down the interaction by examining the 
simple effects at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for both the implicit 
theories variable and future orientation variable. As anticipated, both entity (b = .63, β = .17, p = 
.05, 95% CI = [.00, 1.26]) and incremental theorists (b = .99, β = .27, p = .001, 95% CI = [.41, 
1.58]) were more satisfied with life when they were higher (versus lower) in future orientation. It 
is possible that incremental theorists may be more satisfied (than entity theorists) when high in 
future orientation, however, results find that, in fact, both theory groups were equally as satisfied 
with life when they had a high future focus; b = -.12, β = -.08, p = .31, 95% CI = [-.35, .11]. 
 Present fatalistic time perspective. Present fatalism, a tendency to believe the future is 
pre-destined, was negatively correlated with both life satisfaction; r(203) = -.19, p = .008, and, as 
we anticipated, with implicit theories; r(203) = -.32, p < .001; indicating that entity theorists are 
more present fatalistic. In other words, it seems as if entity theorists are more likely to believe 
that there is not much that can be done about the future – e.g., “que sera sera.” We examined 
present fatalism as an exploratory variable with no specific hypotheses a priori.  
 We conducted the same multiple regression analyses as above, controlling for the other 
four time perspectives, to investigate implicit theories x present fatalism on life satisfaction as 
the dependent variable. We found a significant interaction (see Figure 5); b = -.36, β = -.18, p = 
.002, 95% CI = [-.59, -.14] suggesting that implicit theories moderates the relationship between 
present fatalism and life satisfaction (see Table 11 for β and t values for all predictor variables). 
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Next, we examined the interaction pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple effects 
at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for both the implicit theories variable 
and present fatalism. While life satisfaction was similarly high for both entity and incremental 
theorists when present fatalism was low; b = .07, β = .05, p = .54, 95% CI = [-.16, .31], 
incremental theorists were significantly less satisfied than entity theorists when high in present 
fatalism; b = -.43, β = -.29, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.51, -.36]. Entity theorists did not seem to be 
bothered by high fatalism and did not differ in life satisfaction between high and low present 
fatalism; b = .18, β = .05, p = .53, 95% CI = [-.38, .73]. In contrast, incremental theorists were 
significantly less satisfied with life when they were high (versus low) in present fatalism; b = -
.94, β = -.28, p = .002, 95% CI = [-1.51, -.36]. 
Discussion 
 As expected, we found that incremental theorists are most satisfied with life when they 
sacrifice present benefits in order to work toward future goals whereas entity theorists are most 
satisfied when they are not willing to sacrifice present rewards in order to achieve future goals. 
The willingness to sacrifice measure captures a particular tension between temporal goals – the 
psychological state in which one temporal goal is achieved at the cost of the other. We speculate 
that it is this tension that causes incremental and entity theorists to react differently. However, 
because the willingness to sacrifice has both a present and future component, it could be that 
most of the “action” is driven by one temporal component or the other. We looked at these two 
components separately by examining the two most closely corresponding temporal orientations – 
present hedonism and future orientation. It was possible that entity theorists find no satisfaction 
when striving toward future goals and that incremental theorists find no satisfaction with present-
oriented pursuits. However, analyses indicate that this was not the case. The evidence from 
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Study 1 finds that both entity and incremental theorists report higher life satisfaction with a high 
(vs. low) future oriented perspective and high (vs. low) promotion orientation. Additionally, both 
types of theorists report higher life satisfaction when they are high in present hedonism as 
opposed to low in present hedonism (though entity theorists are more satisfied than incremental 
theorists in this state). Thus, the story seems to best captured when the present is pitted against 
the future; when natural tensions from choosing one over the other surface.  
We hypothesized at the onset of the present study that incremental theorists might be 
more satisfied with life when they are future focused whereas entity theorists might be more 
satisfied with life when they focus on present enjoyment over future goals. Results of the present 
study support this view, but in particular when temporal goals are at odds with one another. 
Because everybody has both present goals and future goals and sometimes must choose one goal 
over another, it emerged that this element of “sacrificing” present goals for future goals (and vice 
versa) appeared to show the predicted effect more clearly than either temporal focus alone. We 
found that incremental theorists are most satisfied with life when they sacrifice present benefits 
in order to work toward future goals whereas entity theorists are more satisfied when they are not 
willing to sacrifice present rewards in order to achieve future goals.  
Study 2 
As Study 1 was correlational where causation cannot be inferred, the goal of Study 2 was 
to examine the causal role of temporal focus (i.e., sacrificing one temporal goal for another) on 
life satisfaction and the moderating role of implicit theories. Thus, in Study 2 we hoped to 
conceptually replicate the findings of Study 1 using an experimental design whereby we 
manipulated the tension between present and future focus highlighting one temporal priority in 
contrast to the other. Similar to Study 1, we predicted that entity theorists would report the 
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highest life satisfaction when the tension between present and future favoured the present. In 
contrast, we expected that incremental theorists would report the highest life satisfaction when 
present vs. future tension favoured the future. 
In Study 2, we used Diener’s five-item measure of life satisfaction (Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen & Griffin, 1985) as the main dependent variable (as opposed to the 1-item OECD 
measure of LS) and pre-measured mood as a potential control variable in addition to initial life 
satisfaction as captured by the 1-item OECD measure of LS.  
Transparency Report: Failure of Random Assignment 
 Before explaining the method and results of Study 2, it is important to note that a failure 
of random assignment was discovered very late in the writing of this dissertation. Specifically, 
although initial levels of life satisfaction did not differ by condition (which had been checked in 
preliminary analyses) it was later discovered that there was a condition x implicit theories 
interaction on initial life satisfaction which makes it impossible to draw clear conclusions from 
the pattern of results in this study. The results (and implications) will be explained in greater 
detail below. The present narrative is included to clarify the timing of discovering this problem 
(after subsequent studies had been conducted and the draft dissertation was written) and the 
subsequent decision making process. One option would be to drop Study 2 from the package 
because its results are so inconclusive. However, following discussion with the members of the 
dissertation committee, we decided it would be appropriate to introduce the methodology and 
briefly report the results of Study 2. Although this study leaves us with no conclusions regarding 
our main hypotheses, the methodology became the jumping-off point for Studies 3 through 5. 
Methodological decisions made later in the research process are better understood when Study 
2’s method is first described. Also keep in mind that the problems of interpretation for this study 
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do not pertain to a problem of methodology, only a problem of (fluke) failure of random 
assignment.  
In Study 2 we initially set out to manipulate present vs. future focus and also to test some 
possible third variables/alternative explanations. Unfortunately, the results of two additional 
potential third variables that were explored in Study 2 are also impossible to interpret due to the 
failure of random assignment. These were: consideration of future consequences (Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) and approach/avoidance (Elliot & Thrash, 2010). 
Coverage of these items has been removed from the method and results section, however, the full 
set of measures is still available for review in Appendix B.  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and eight participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Eight participants failed one or both attention checks, five participants did not complete the 
dependent measures and nine participants spent either less than 30 seconds or more than 1000 
seconds generating their present versus future focused event.2 In total, twenty-two participants 
were eliminated from all analyses leaving 186 participants (Mage = 36.58, SD = 11.66; 111 
female, 75 male).  
                                                 
2 Inattentive and careless responses can affect data quality leading to lower reliability (Mead & Bartholomew, 2012). 
Careless responding in internet survey research is a growing concern. Mead and Bartholomew (2012) identified 
approximately 10-12% of their student respondents as careless responders and suggested that an important index for 
identifying careless responses is by examining response time. Thus, it was determined a priori that a minimum of 
thirty seconds would be required to thoughtfully generate a present versus future focused event. Eliminating 
participants who spent less than 30 seconds generating an event served as an additional attention check. 
Additionally, we eliminated three participants who spent more than 1000 seconds generating their event as this these 
participants may have been distracted during the process resulting in reduced attention toward the subtle 
psychological manipulation. 
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Measures 
Life satisfaction pre-measure. As in Study 1, all participants rated their overall life 
satisfaction using the OECD 1-item measure of life satisfaction (Helliwell et al., 2012): “All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?”  
Mood. A one-item measure was used to capture present mood. On a Likert scale 
anchored at endpoints 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree) participants rated their level of 
agreement to the statement, “Right now, I don't feel very happy.” 
Implicit theories. Similar to Study 1, implicit theories were measured using the Dweck 
(1999) implicit theory of personality measure (see Appendix B). Whereas Study 1 used a two-
item abridged measure, the present study employed the full 10-items as recommended by Dweck 
(Dweck, 1999). Five of the items were reverse scored which provides an overall score where 
higher numbers indicate the incremental theory perspective and lower numbers indicate the 
entity theory perspective. A composite score where higher numbers indicate a stronger 
incremental theory was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of personality 
(Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Manipulation: The tension between present desires and future rewards. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two tension conditions: Sacrificing a present benefit in order 
to prioritize a future benefit (future induction) or sacrificing a future benefit in order to prioritize 
a present benefit (present induction). Across both conditions, participants were first provided 
with a preamble describing the tension between [future/present]. It was stated:  
“Sometimes in life, there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and 
what we hope to achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice 
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or set aside [an immediate (or present) goal/a future goal] or desire in order to [work toward a 
long-term goal/satisfy an immediate (or present) goal or desire].”  
Specific examples were then provided in each condition. In the present induction 
condition it was stated that “people sometimes choose to enjoy a night out with friends now even 
though it may hinder work on a project that might benefit a future career. Or, perhaps the 
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now may be prioritized over a desire to save money for the 
future.”  
In the future induction condition the example given was that “people may choose to 
sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work on a project that might benefit a 
future career. Or, perhaps a desire to save money for the future may be prioritized over the 
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.” See Appendix B for the entire script. 
Goal elicitation. In both the present and future conditions, participants were then asked 
to think of a decision that they are working on these days - or worked on recently - where they 
are sacrificing some [present/future] benefit in order to prioritize a [future/present] benefit. 
Participants were then asked to briefly describe what that decision was. The open-ended goals 
(both present and future) were examined and coded for the general domain of the goals. For 
example, 47% referred to financial goals (e.g., “I am sticking with my crappy old car so that I 
can save up for a new house.”); 18% referred to family or relationship goals (e.g., “I decided I 
would rather save up a little money first in order to get an apartment so that my daughter could 
be with me.”); 15% referred to career goals (e.g., “I spend the greatest majority of my free time 
working on building my businesses.”); 18% referred to leisure goals, 12 % referred to education 
goals, and 8% referred to health goals. A number of present vs. future goals crossed two domains 
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(e.g., “I decided to spend more time raising my kids and less time on my hobbies,” and, “The 
decision to sacrifice free time with family to work overtime for financial goals.”) 
Goal importance. Following the dependent variable measure of life satisfaction 
participants were asked to rate the importance of both the present goal and the future goal (i.e., 
the present vs. future goal pitted against each other during the tension manipulation) generated 
during goal elicitation. On a 7-point Likert scale anchored at endpoints 1(not at all important) to 
7(extremely important), participants were asked, “How important was the future goal at the 
time?” and “How important was the present goal at the time?” 
Mood DV – Happiness right now. Because present mood can occasionally affect 
people’s reports of life satisfaction (Eid & Diener, 2004) we were interested in capturing 
participants’ mood prior to assessing life satisfaction in order to examine if mood moved around 
by manipulated condition and implicit theories. We had no specific hypotheses for mood as Eid 
and Diener (2004) report that mood effects are generally small and inconsistent. If we find only 
effects of our manipulation and implicit theories on the life satisfaction DV and not on the mood 
DV, we can proceed with more confidence that life satisfaction, as measured below, reflects 
participants’ cognitive, judgmental evaluations of their life – a more accurate definition of life 
satisfaction – as described by Diener et al. (2003). 
Mood was captured with a 4-item measure. On a Likert scale anchored at endpoints 
1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants rated their disagreement/agreement with 
four statements such as “Right now, I don’t feel very happy” [R] and “I feel very happy.” A 
composite score where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood was calculated 
(Cronbach’s α = .91). 
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Life satisfaction DV. Life satisfaction (LS) was captured by Diener’s measure of global 
life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). This measure captures a global evaluation of life as a 
whole. The five-item scale has been used in a great deal of research and has shown consistent 
internal reliability and strong predictive power (Pavot & Diener, 1993). On a Likert scale 
anchored at endpoints 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants rated their 
disagreement/agreement with five statements such as “I am satisfied with my life,” and “If I 
could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.” A composite score where higher 
numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .94). 
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present 
for the future was the same measure used in Study 1 and in the present study was used to assess 
the effectiveness of our present versus future tension manipulation; α = .77. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session. After 
the demographics section, participants answered the 1-item life satisfaction question and the 1-
item mood question. Then participants completed the implicit theories of personality measure 
(Dweck, 1999). Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two tension manipulation 
conditions: Sacrificing a present benefit in order to prioritize a future benefit (future induction) 
or sacrificing a future benefit in order to prioritize a present benefit (present induction). 
Participants were asked to think of a goal they are working on, or recently worked on, congruent 
with the assigned condition and briefly describe the decision. Following the manipulation, all 
participants completed the life satisfaction (LS) dependent measure. Finally, they completed the 
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future scale (Hayes et al., 2015) which served as a 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 44 
 
check of our manipulation. Intercorrelations between all of the variables in the study are 
presented in Table 12. 
Results and Discussion 
Central Analyses 
According to our hypothesis, the question of interest was determining how entity versus 
incremental theorists differed in their life satisfaction after bringing to mind a present-oriented 
goal versus a future-oriented goal. 
Preliminary Analyses 
As a test of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit theories of 
personality, present mood and initial life satisfaction did not differ by tension condition (i.e., 
present focus vs. future focus). Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs and found that lay 
theories of personality did not differ by tension condition; F(1,184) = .12, p = .73; Neither did 
participants’ mood at the onset of the study; F(1,184) = .28, p = .60, or initial life satisfaction; 
F(1,184) = .73, p = .40. The means and standard deviations of all measures across the two 
conditions (present focus vs. future focus) are reported in Table 13. 
Manipulation Checks 
Willingness to sacrifice present for future. In order to determine if the present focus 
versus future focus tension manipulation had its desired effect we examined participants’ 
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future by condition (present focus vs. future focus). 
Results from the one-way ANOVA indicate that the manipulation seemed to have its desired 
effect. In the future focus condition, participants were more willing to sacrifice the present for 
the future (M = 5.00, SD = 1.14) than in the present focus condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.08); F(1, 
184) = 8.09, p = .005, η2 = .04. Our manipulation check was also tested in regression analyses. 
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Condition (present vs. future focus, with present condition coded -1 reflecting the reference 
group), as recommended by Aiken and West (1991), and implicit theories, along with the 
interaction term were regressed on willingness to sacrifice the present for the future as the 
dependent measure. Similar to the results of the ANOVA, a main effect of condition emerged as 
significant; b = .24, β = .21, p = .004, 95% CI = [.08, .40]. A main effect of implicit theories 
emerged as marginal; b = .13, β = .13, p = .07, 95% CI = [-.01, .27], indicating that incremental 
theorists, overall, were slightly more willing to sacrifice the present for the future; however the 
interaction was not significant: b = .05, β = .05, p = .49, 95% CI = [-.09, .19].3  
Goal importance. Additionally, we compared the goal importance ratings for present 
goals and future goals by manipulated focus condition in a repeated measures multivariate 
analysis. Recall that within each focus condition, participants were asked to recall a time when a 
present goal was contrasted to a future goal. In other words, both a present goal and a future goal 
were elicited however it was the tension between the two goals that was manipulated. As 
anticipated, we found that in the present focus condition, present goals were rated more 
important (M = 5.94, SD = 1.01) than future goals (M = 5.57, SD = 1.38); Pillai’s F(1, 183) = 
4.56, p = .03, η2 = .02; and in the future focus condition, future goals (M = 6.14, SD = .73) were 
rated more important than present goals (M = 5.05, SD = 1.60); Pillai’s F(1, 183) = 36.96, p < 
.001, η2 = .17.4 
We also examined importance ratings separately with implicit theories as a possible 
moderator. Looking only at importance ratings of present goals, we regressed both implicit 
theories and condition (present focus vs. future focus; effect coded, where -1 reflects the present 
                                                 
3 Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the regression analysis. Furthermore there was 
no main effect of initial life satisfaction on willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; β = .02, p = .83. 
4 Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the repeated measures multivariate analysis. 
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condition) onto present importance as the criterion variable. As anticipated, a main effect of 
condition emerged as significant; b = -.44, β = -.31, p < .001, 95% CI = [-.61, -.24] indicating 
that present goals were rated more important in the present focus condition. Neither the main 
effect of implicit theories (b = .08, β = .07, p = .33) nor the interaction (b = .01, β = .01, p = .95) 
was significant.5  
Looking at importance ratings of future goals, we performed the same regression analysis 
as above with future importance as the criterion variable. As anticipated, a main effect of 
condition emerged significant; b = .30, β = .25, p < .001, 95% CI = [.14, .46] indicating that 
future goals were rated more important in the future focus condition. A main effect of implicit 
theories emerged as marginally significant (b = .12, β = .12, p = .10, 95% CI = [-.02, .26]) 
indicating that, overall, incremental theorists rated future goals as more important than entity 
theorists. Additionally, an interaction between condition and implicit theories emerged as 
significant; b = -.15, β = -.15, p = .034, 95% CI = [-.29, -.01].6 We examined the interaction 
pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple effects at one standard deviation (SD) 
above and below the mean for the implicit theories variable. Entity theorists, defined at 1 SD 
below the mean, rated future goals as less important in the present focus condition than when in 
the future focus condition; b = .94, β = .41, p < .001, 95% CI = [.49, 1.40], whereas there was no 
difference in future goal importance ratings between conditions for incremental theorists 
(defined at one SD above the mean); b = .24, β = .10, p = .31. In the present focus condition, 
incremental theorists rated future goals as more important than entity theorists did; b = .27, β = 
                                                 
5 Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the regression analysis. Furthermore there was 
no main effect of initial life satisfaction on present goal importance ratings; β = .01, p = .99. 
6 Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the regression analysis. Furthermore there was 
no main effect of initial life satisfaction on future goal importance ratings; β = .01, p = .94. 
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.27, p = .005, 95% CI = [.08, .45], whereas there was no difference between implicit theories in 
the future focus condition; b = -.03, β = -.03, p = .75.  
Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship Between Temporal Focus and Life 
Satisfaction? 
In the present study, we had one continuous variable and one categorical variable. As in 
Study 1, we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the implicit theory x 
temporal focus condition (present focus vs. future focus) interaction term as a predictor of life 
satisfaction. We entered life satisfaction as the criterion variable. As in Study 1, we centred our 
implicit theories IV. In addition, we adjusted our categorical condition variable to reflect effect 
coding (with present condition coded -1 reflecting the reference group), as recommended by 
Aiken and West (1991). Both IVs were entered in Step 1, and, in Step 2 we entered the 
interaction term: Implicit theory x condition (present focus vs. future focus).  
As expected, an implicit theories x temporal focus condition interaction emerged, 
although marginally significant: (see Figure 6); b = .20, β = .14, p = .057, 95% CI = [-.01, .40]. 
When present mood (measured at the beginning of the study) was entered as a control variable in 
the first step of the regression, the interaction reached traditional levels of significance; b = .16, β 
= .12, p = .048, 95% CI = [.01, .32].7 The interaction suggests that implicit theories moderates 
the relationship between temporal focus and life satisfaction (see Table 14 for β and t values for 
all predictor variables). No main effects for either condition (b = -.21, β = -.15, p = .13) or 
implicit theories emerged (b = -.19, β = -.06, p = .44). 
                                                 
7 When mood (measured just prior to Diener’s life satisfaction) was tested as the DV, there was no interaction 
between manipulated condition and implicit theories (β = .14, p = .17) nor were there any main effects of condition 
or implicit theories (p’s > .72). 
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Subsequent Analyses: Discovery of Failed Random Assignment 
As noted in the introduction to Study 2, condition differences were not found on initial 
life satisfaction, therefore covariates were not included when initially testing our main 
hypothesis. On the advice of a committee member, and late in the process, we conducted 
analyses with the covariate of initial life satisfaction and found, quite unexpectedly, that this 
wiped out the effects. For this analysis, the 1-item OECD measure of life satisfaction was 
standardized and entered in Step 1 of the regression. Both IVs were entered in Step 2, and the 
interaction term was entered in Step 3. With initial LS as a control variable in the analysis, the 
implicit theories x temporal focus condition interaction was no longer significant; b = .03, β = 
.02, p = .58 (see Table 15 for β and t values for all predictor variables). 
Upon further investigation, we determined that the pre-measure of life satisfaction sowed 
a marginal interaction; b = .30, β = .14, p = .068, 95% CI = [-.02, .61]; see Table 16 for β and t 
values for all predictor variables. No main effects for either condition (b = -.15, β = -.06, p = .43) 
or implicit theories emerged (b = -.06, β = -.03, p = .72). The interaction pattern on initial LS, 
measured at the start of the study (shown in Figure 7) is remarkably similar to the pattern found 
with our main dependent variable assessed at the end of the study (shown in Figure 6). Thus, the 
overall results on our DV of lay theories and manipulated condition become impossible to 
interpret and raise the question as to whether or not the effects (without co-varying initial life 
satisfaction) are real. 
Discussion 
 In Study 2 we used an experimental design whereby we manipulated the tension between 
present and future. However, a failure of random assignment was discovered very late in the 
writing of this dissertation.  
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To be clear, it should be noted that Studies 3 through 5 were conducted and written up 
prior to discovering the error in Study 2, however the following studies have been edited in terms 
of any references made to Study 2’s results. We proceed now to Study 3 whereby we, once 
again, manipulate the tension between present focus and future focus. In addition, Study 3 used a 
more controlled set of goals (spending and saving goals). We go forward recognizing the need 
for further research and replication prior to drawing clear conclusions about the effect and its 
boundary conditions. 
Study 3 
 In Study 2, participants were allowed to generate self-relevant idiosyncratic decisions 
involving tension between present and future goals. We found that almost half of the participants 
(47%) included decisions involving financial tensions. For example, in Study 2, one participant 
wrote, “I made the decision to not go on a ski trip in the spring so I could pay my rent.”  
Thus, Study 3 examined the finance domain more directly: spending now versus saving 
for the future. Additionally, we elicited both a present goal (spend now) and future goal (save for 
the future) prior to pitting the two goals against each other (i.e., the tension manipulation) 
whereby one goal is sacrificed in order to satisfy the other. We anticipated that incremental 
theorists will indicate higher life satisfaction after they describe saving for the future (rather than 
spending in the present) whereas entity theorists will indicate higher life satisfaction after they 
describe spending in the present (versus saving for the future). 
 Study 3 is different in two other important ways. First, in Study 2, participants were 
asked to generate a recent decision where the present benefit/goal and future benefit/goal are 
already paired and producing tension. Where this methodological structure may have captured 
meaningful tension over which goal was sacrificed (e.g., present over future and vice versa), the 
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simultaneous recall of both a present and a future goal may also have elicited present/future 
tension decisions already favoring the condition (present focus or future focus) that the 
participant was assigned to. Indeed, we found in Study 2 that participants assigned to the present 
focus condition rated their present goals as more important than future goals, and in the future 
focus condition, future goals were rated more important than present goals. To address this 
possibility methodologically, in Study 3 we asked participants to first generate a potential present 
goal (i.e., spend in the present) and then generate a potential future goal (i.e., save for the future) 
prior to asking the participants to imagine only carrying through with one of the goals – either 
spending in the present or saving for the future (the tension manipulation). Second, whereas in 
Study 2, participants were asked to generate tension decisions that they made recently (or are 
presently working on), participants in Study 3 were asked to think of a financial decision they 
could make now or very soon the future. In other words, we focused them on yet-to-be made 
decisions that is, by its nature, somewhat hypothetical in nature. They imagined how they would 
feel if they pursued one goal at the expense of the other; we of course cannot push them to 
actually follow through and have no information on which if any goals they actually chose to 
pursue.  
 In sum, although we are producing a cleaner methodological structure for the 
manipulation in Study 3 by eliciting present and future goals separately before introducing the 
tension, it is possible that this improvement will come at a cost. Assigning people to imagine 
selecting one of two financial goals could somewhat undermine the natural meaning found in 
self-relevant decision-making between present rewards and potential future outcomes, because 
the choice is more hypothetical and the domain is constrained to money. 
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 Finally, in the present study, we sought to directly examine the relationship between 
implicit theories and feelings of certainty about attaining present (spend) and future (save) goals; 
a likely process variable between implicit theories and life satisfaction. Previous research has 
found that incremental theorists tend to feel an internal locus of control over future outcomes 
(Dweck, 1995a) and have higher expectations of goal success than entity theorists (Burnette et 
al., 2013), however, these relationships are less well-known outside of academic, learning and 
achievement contexts. 
Method 
Participants 
 Three hundred and fifteen participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk and Crowdflower which are both crowd-sourcing forums. Forty-three participants failed 
one or both attention checks, one participant did not complete the manipulated IV, twenty-one 
participants indicated they had completed the study for a second time and eleven participants 
spent less than 30 seconds generating their present versus future focused event.8 In total, seventy-
six participants were eliminated from all analyses leaving 239 participants (Mage = 37.15, SD = 
12.95; 122 female, 115 male, 2 undisclosed). 
Measures 
Life Satisfaction and mood pre-measures. Life satisfaction and mood were pre-
measured as in Study 2. 
Implicit theories. As in Study 2, implicit theories were measured using the Dweck 
(1999) implicit theory of personality measure (α = .95). 
                                                 
8 As in Study 2, it was determined a priori that participants who spent less than thirty seconds generating a present 
versus future focused event would be deemed careless responders. Thus, eliminating participants who spent less than 
30 seconds generating an event served as an additional attention check. There were no participants who spent more 
than 1000 seconds generating their event. 
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Present and future goal elicitation. Participants were asked to generate two goals 
independently: a present goal (spend now) and a future goal (save for later). First all participants 
were asked to think about and describe a decision they could make now to spend money on 
something that they will enjoy immediately and in the short-term future. Then, all participants 
were asked to think about and describe a decision they could make now to save money in order 
to achieve some longer-term goal or make a distant future purchase. See Appendix C for the 
entire script. 
Goal importance and achievement certainty. Following each goal elicitation (and prior 
to the goal focus manipulation), participants were asked to indicate the degree to which each goal 
was important: from 1(not at all important) to 7(extremely important). For the present (spend 
now) goal, participants were asked, “How personally important is to you to act on the decision to 
spend now for the short term?” For the future (save now) goal, participants were asked, “How 
personally important is it to act on the decision to save now for a long-term future goal? 
Additionally, participants were asked about goal achievement certainty for each goal. 
From 1(not certain at all) to 7(extremely certain), participants were asked, “How certain are you 
that if you acted on this short term [long term] goal, you would ultimately achieve the desired 
outcome?” Participants rated their certainty for both the present-focused (spend) goal and the 
future-focused (save) goal. 
Manipulation: The tension between present desires and future rewards. All 
participants read an introductory paragraph where it was stated that “tension exists between 
spending money on things we want to have or do now and on things we hope to have or do in the 
long-term future.” Participants were randomly assigned to one of two tension conditions: 
Sacrificing a present benefit in order to prioritize a future benefit (future focus – save money for 
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the future) or sacrificing a future benefit in order to prioritize a present benefit (present focus – 
spend now). In both conditions, participants were then asked to imagine that “only one of the 
goals can be fulfilled.” In the present focus condition participants were asked to “focus on 
fulfilling only the current desire (spend now) – at the expense of the longer-term desire.” In the 
future focus condition, participants were asked to “focus on fulfilling only the future desire (save 
for the future) – at the expense of the short-term desire.” 
Mood DV – happiness right now. Mood was captured with the same four-item measure 
as in Study 2. A composite score where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood was 
calculated (Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Life satisfaction DV. As in Study 2, life satisfaction (LS) was captured by Diener’s 
measure of global life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). A composite score where higher 
numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .92). 
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present 
for the future was the same measure used in Study 1 and in the present study was used to assess 
the effectiveness of our present versus future tension manipulation; Cronbach’s α = .77. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session in the 
same order as listed above (see also Appendix C). Intercorrelations between all of the variables 
in the study are presented in Table 17. 
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Results and Discussion 
Central Analyses 
Preliminary Analyses 
To check the success of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit 
theories of personality, present mood and the LS pre-measure did not differ by tension condition 
(i.e., present focus vs. future focus). Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs and found that 
lay theories of personality did not differ by tension condition; F(1, 237) = .23, p = .63; neither 
did participants’ mood at the onset of the study; F(1, 237) = 2.04, p = .16. However, we did find 
a marginal difference in participants’ pre-measure of life satisfaction by condition; F(1, 237) = 
3.72, p = .055, η2 = .015 such that participants in the present focus (spend now) condition 
reported lower life satisfaction at the onset of the study; Mpres = 7.04, SD = 2.28, than those in the 
future focus (save) condition; Mfut= 7.55, SD = 2.09.
9 We investigate the differences between 
those initially low and high in life satisfaction further on. The means and standard deviations of 
all measures across the two conditions (present focus vs. future focus) are reported in Table 18. 
Manipulation Checks 
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. In order to determine if the present 
focus versus future focus tension manipulation had its desired effect we examined participants’ 
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future by condition (present focus vs. future focus). 
We regressed condition (present vs. future focus using effect codes) and implicit theories, along 
with the interaction term, onto the willingness to sacrifice composite score as the dependent 
measure. Although we might have expected a main effect of condition, this did not emerge as 
                                                 
9 Similar to Study 2, after writing the dissertation in its entirety, a precautionary check of random assignment was 
performed on initial life satisfaction and mood by regressing both condition and implicit theories on to these pre-
measures. In the present study, an interaction did not emerge for initial life satisfaction (β = .002, p = .97) nor did an 
interaction emerge for initial mood (β = -.05, p = .43). 
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significant: β = .01, p = .83. The main effect of implicit theories was also not significant; β = .09, 
p = .15, nor was the interaction; β = .001, p = .99.10  
It is possible that measuring willingness to sacrifice the present for the future was not the 
most suitable manipulation check in the present study for a couple of reasons. First, this variable 
was measured at the end of the study, and any potential effects of the manipulation may have 
dissipated by the time participants got to this questionnaire. A more likely explanation is that the 
manipulation itself was importantly different than the manipulation of Study 2 where differences 
were seen in the willingness to sacrifice manipulation check measure. In Study 2 participants 
were asked to think of a time they decided (or are currently deciding) to sacrifice the present for 
the future for a personally chosen goal that they actually worked on or were planning to. The 
manipulation of the present study, on the other hand, asked participants to imagine fulfilling only 
one of their financial goals; a process that is more hypothetical in nature and thus, not as likely to 
convince participants of their underlying willingness to sacrifice one way or the other. 
Goal importance. Similar to Study 2, we compared the goal importance ratings for 
present goals and future goals by manipulated focus condition in a repeated measures 
multivariate analysis. In Study 2, participants seemed to choose goals whose relative importance 
was also congruent with the condition they were assigned to (e.g., present goals were rated more 
important than future goals in the present focus condition, and vice versa in the future focus 
condition). In the financial domain of the present study, recall that importance was measured 
prior to the goal focus manipulation so it should be unaffected by condition. We found that 
future-oriented (saving goals) were rated more important overall (M = 5.87, SD = 1.32) than 
present-oriented (spending goals) (M = 4.42, SD = 1.62); Pillai’s F(1, 234) = 143.30, p < .001, η2 
                                                 
10 Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction. 
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= .38; and this was consistent across conditions. There was no within-subject (present/future 
ratings) interaction with condition; Pillai’s F(1, 234) = .96, p = .33, or with implicit theories; 
Pillai’s F(1, 234) = 1.20, p = .27; nor was there a 3-way interaction; Pillai’s F(1, 234) = .83, p = 
.37.11 
We also examined importance ratings separately with implicit theories as a possible 
moderator. Looking first at importance ratings of present (spend) goals, we regressed both 
implicit theories and condition (present vs. future; effect coded) onto present importance as the 
criterion variable. Neither the main effect of condition (β = -.01, p = .86), nor the interaction (β = 
-.04, p = .64) emerged as significant. A main effect of implicit theories emerged as marginal; b = 
.15, β = .11, p = .09, 95% CI = [-.03, .32], suggesting that incremental theorists rated the present 
(spend) goal as somewhat more important than entity theorists overall.12 
Looking at importance ratings of future (save) goals, we performed the same regression 
analysis as above with future importance as the criterion variable. Neither the main effect of 
condition (β = .08, p = .25) or the main effect of implicit theories (β = -.06, p = .37) emerged as 
significant. An interaction, however, emerged as marginal; b = -.12, β = -.11, p = .08, 95% CI = 
[-.27, .02].13 A review of simple effects found that entity theorists rated future (save) goals as 
marginally more important than incremental theorists in the future-focus condition; b = -.19, β = 
-.17, p = .06, 05% CI = [-.38, .01], whereas they did not differ in the present-focus condition; β = 
.06, p = .56. Entity theorists also rated future (save) goals as more important in the future-focus 
condition than they did in the present-focus condition; b = .48, β = .18, p = .05, 95% CI = [.00, 
.95], whereas incremental theorists did not differ between conditions; β = -.03, p = .72. The 
                                                 
11 Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction. 
12 Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction, however, the initial marginal effect of 
implicit theories became less significant (β = .10, p = .11). 
13 The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction. 
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interaction for future goal importance should be interpreted with caution as these ratings were 
captured before participants were randomly assignment to condition. We will control for this 
variable when testing our main hypothesis. 
Goal achievement certainty. As with goal importance ratings, goal achievement 
certainty was measured immediately after each goal elicitation and prior to random assignment 
of condition, thus, goal achievement certainty should not differ by condition. One-way ANOVAs 
were conducted and, indeed, we found that participants felt just as certain about achieving the 
present (spend) goal in the present-focused condition (M = 5.73, SD = 1.30) as they did in the 
future-focused condition (M = 5.84, SD = 1.34); F(1, 237) = .54, p = .54. Participants also felt 
just as certain about achieving the future (save) goal in the present-focused condition (M = 5.29, 
SD = 1.50) as they did in the future-focused condition (M = 5.43, SD = 1.48); F(1, 237) = .46, p 
= .46. Notably, participants felt more certain overall of achieving the present outcome (M = 5.78, 
SD = 1.32) than the future outcome (M = 5.36, SD = 1.49); F(1, 237) = 16.98, p < .001, η2 = .07. 
We also examined certainty ratings separately with implicit theories included as a 
predictor. Looking first at certainty ratings of present (spend) goals, we regressed both implicit 
theories and condition (present vs. future; effect coded) onto present goal certainty as the 
criterion variable. Previous research has found that incremental theorists tend to feel more 
internal control over one’s outcomes (vs. entity theorists; Dweck et al., 1995a) and tend to report 
higher expectations of goal success (Burnette et al., 2013). However, it was possible that both 
entity and incremental theorists might feel certain about achieving imminent (i.e., present) goals. 
Despite this possibility, a main effect of implicit theories emerged as significant; b = .17, β = .15, 
p = .02, 95% CI = [.03, .31], suggesting that incremental theorists did, indeed, feel more certain 
about achieving present (spend) goals overall. As expected, there was no effect of condition; β = 
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.03, p =.67, however, an unexpected interaction emerged as significant; b = .14, β = .13, p = .05, 
95% CI = [.00, .28].14 A review of simple effects found that entity and incremental theorists did 
not differ on certainty about achieving present (spend) goals in the present-focused condition; β 
= .03, p = .75, whereas, in the future-focused condition, incremental theorists were more certain 
about achieving the spending goals than entity theorists; b = .31, β = .28, p = .002, 95% CI = 
[.12, .50]. Also, entity theorists did not differ in certainty about spending in the present between 
the present-focused and future-focused conditions; β = -.09, p = .32, whereas incremental 
theorists felt marginally more certain about achieving present (spend) goals in the future-focused 
condition than they did in the present-focused condition; b = .38, β = .15, p = .09, 95% CI = [-
.06, .82]. As with the future goal importance ratings above, the interaction for present goal 
achievement certainty should be interpreted with caution as these ratings were garnered prior to 
random assignment to the two conditions. We will control for this variable in tests of our main 
hypothesis. 
Looking at certainty ratings of future (save) goals, we ran the same regression for future-
goal certainty as the criterion variable. Based on Burnette et al.’s findings (2013) noted above 
(i.e., incremental theorists hold higher expectations of goal success), we anticipated that 
incremental theorists might feel more certain about achieving more distant/future goals. As 
expected, a main effect of implicit theories emerged as significant; b = .18, β = .15, p = .02, 95% 
CI = [.03, .34], suggesting that, similar to present (spend) goal certainty, incremental theorists 
felt more certain about achieving future (save) goals as well. There was no effect of condition; β 
= .03, p =.67 nor an interaction between condition and implicit theories; β = -.07, p = .27.15 
                                                 
14 Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction. 
15 The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction. 
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Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship Between Temporal Perspective and Life 
Satisfaction? 
As in Study 2, we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the 
implicit theory x temporal focus condition (present focus vs. future focus) interaction term as a 
predictor of life satisfaction. We entered the centred implicit theories IV and our effect coded 
condition variable in Step 1. In Step 2 we entered the interaction term: Implicit theory x 
condition (present focus vs. future focus, effect coded). Inconsistent with predictions, the 
predicted two-way interaction did not emerge as significant: β = .04, p = .52. 16,17 Neither the 
main effect of condition (β = .08, p = .20) nor implicit theories was significant (β = .05, p = .45). 
Does income play a moderating role? We wondered if it was possible that income (as 
measured during the demographic intake at the beginning of the study) might play a moderating 
role. Considering that the domain of focus for the present study was the financial domain, it is 
entirely possible that people with more money/higher incomes might not experience the same 
tension between spending now and saving for later. For example, buying concert tickets now 
might not really interfere with saving for a house. For someone with higher income, this type of 
decision-making might not create tension between present goals and future goals. 
Thus, we ran the same regression analysis as above with income as an additional 
moderator. However, before proceeding with this analysis, we confirmed that income did not 
vary between the manipulated conditions; F(1, 223) = .17, p = .70.  Results of the 3-way 
regression analysis on life satisfaction found that the three-way interaction between condition, 
                                                 
16 The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction as well as when controlling for 
future goal importance and present goal achievement certainty. 
17 When mood was tested as the DV, there was no interaction between manipulated condition and implicit theories 
(β = -.02, p = .74). Only an effect of implicit theories emerged for mood; b = .32, β = .23, p < .001, 95% CI = [.15, 
.50], suggesting that incremental theorists had a more positive mood than entity theorists. This finding is consistent 
with the initial mood measure at the start of the study. There was no main effect of condition (b = .09, p = .18). 
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implicit theories and income did not emerge as significant: b = -.02, β = -.04, p = .60, 95% CI = 
[-.07, .40].18 
In the present study, income and initial life satisfaction are correlated; r(225) = .18, p = 
.009. To illustrate this, when we examined income differences between those low and high (via 
median split) in initial life satisfaction using a one-way ANOVA we found that participants 
initially high in life satisfaction earned significantly more money (MHighSat = $58,996, SD = 
$33,375) than those initially low in life satisfaction (MLowSat = $48,532, SD = $33,132); F(1, 223) 
= 5.36, p = .022, η2 = .02. However, we surmised, that although income can often be a rough 
indicator of life satisfaction (Meyers & Diener, 1995), it is not always a perfect indicator of life 
satisfaction as some people might find great life satisfaction even when they are living on very 
little (Meyers & Diener, 1995). 
To this point, we found that physical resources (i.e., income) did not play a moderating 
role with implicit theories and temporal focus (present vs. future), however, there may be 
something about psychological resources that may play an important role. Myers and Diener 
(1995) found that satisfaction with income can be a better predictor of life satisfaction than 
actual income. Based on this reasoning, we decided to examine initial life satisfaction (measured 
at the beginning of the study) as an additional independent variable/moderator in the original 
regression. 
Does Initial life satisfaction play a moderating role? We conducted a multiple 
regression analysis allowing us to assess the initial life satisfaction x implicit theory x temporal 
focus condition (present focus vs. future focus) interaction term as a predictor of life satisfaction. 
As anticipated, a significant main effect of initial life satisfaction revealed that initial LS 
                                                 
18 The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction as well as when controlling for 
future goal importance and present goal achievement certainty. 
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predicted later LS; b = .54, β = .82, p < .001, 95% CI = [.49, .59]. More importantly, a three-way 
interaction between implicit theory, condition, and initial life satisfaction also emerged 
significant; b = -.09, β = -.11, p = .03, 95% CI = [-.16, -.01]. None of the other main effects or 
two-way interactions were significant (p’s > .12). See Table 19 for β and t values for all predictor 
variables.19, 20 
 Next, we broke down the three-way interaction by examining the initial low and high 
satisfaction groups separately. An implicit theories x temporal focus condition interaction did not 
emerge for those initially high in life satisfaction (see Figure 8); b = -.02, β = -.03, p = .76, 
whereas, as anticipated, the interaction did emerge as significant for those initially low in life 
satisfaction (see Figure 9); b = .24, β = .22, p = .031, 95% CI = [.02, .45].21, 22 No main effect for 
either condition (b = -.02, β = -.02, p = .87) or implicit theory (b = .14, β = .13, p = .21) emerged 
among those low in initial life satisfaction; see Table 20 for β and t values. 
 Next, we examined the interaction pattern for those low in initial life satisfaction in 
regression analysis by examining the simple effects at one standard deviation (SD) above and 
below the mean for the implicit theories variable. Similar to the pattern we saw in Study 2, entity 
theorists (defined at 1 SD below the mean) were somewhat but not significantly more satisfied 
with life than incremental theorists (defined at 1 SD above the mean) when temporal tension 
                                                 
19 The same results were obtained when controlling for future goal importance and present goal achievement 
certainty. 
20 When mood was tested as the DV, there was no 3-way interaction between initial life satisfaction, manipulated 
condition and implicit theories (β = -.06, p = .28). Furthermore, when mood (DV) was entered as a control variable 
in the initial regression, the 3-way interaction on Diener LS remained close to significant; b = -.04, β = -.07, p = 
.058, 95% CI = [ -.07, .00].  
21 When mood was tested as the DV, there was no interaction between manipulated condition and implicit theories 
(β = .00, p = .99) for those initially low in life satisfaction – nor was there an interaction for those initially high in 
life satisfaction (β = -.02, p = .83). Furthermore, when mood (DV) was entered as a control variable in the initial 
regression for those initially low in life satisfaction, the interaction on Diener LS strengthened; b = .24, β = .22, p = 
.008, 95% CI = [.07, .41]. 
22 The same results were obtained when controlling for future goal importance and present goal achievement 
certainty. 
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favoured a present focus; b = -.57, β = -.23, p = .11, 95% CI = [-1.28, .13]. Incremental theorists 
were much more satisfied than entity theorists in the future focus condition; b = .38, β = .34, p = 
.024, 95% CI = [.05, .70], but not significantly more than in the present focus condition; b = .49, 
β = .20, p = .15, 95% CI = [-.18, 1.17]. Entity and incremental theorists did not differ in LS in the 
present focus condition; b = -.10, β = -.09, p = .48, 95% CI = [-.39, .18].23 
Discussion 
In Study 3 we targeted participants’ attention to decisions that they make in the financial 
domain (e.g., present – spend now vs. future – save for later). We anticipated that, overall, 
incremental theorists would be more satisfied with life (than entity theorists) when they 
sacrificed spending in the present to focus on saving for the future and entity theorists would be 
more satisfied (than incremental theorists) when they sacrificed saving for the future and focused 
on present (saving) goals. 
We found that when we examined the group initially high in life satisfaction, there were 
no differences after the sacrifice (present/spend vs. future/save) manipulation on Diener’s life 
satisfaction between entity and incremental theorists. Entity theorists reported the same 
satisfaction as incremental theorists when sacrificing the present (i.e., saving) and incremental 
theorists reported the same satisfaction as entity theorists when sacrificing the future (i.e., 
saving). However, our hypotheses were confirmed when we examined the group that was 
initially low in initial life satisfaction. Entity theorists were more satisfied when they focused on 
spending in the present (over saving for the future) and incremental theorists were more satisfied 
than entity theorists when they contemplated saving for the future. 
                                                 
23 Simple effects tests were conducted without any covariates, however, when mood (DV) was controlled for, simple 
effects remained the same (and in some cases strengthened). 
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Although we attempted to produce a cleaner methodological structure for the 
manipulation in Study 3 by eliciting present and future goals separately before introducing the 
tension, it is possible that we lost some natural meaning found in self-relevant decision-making 
tensions that come with deciding between present rewards and potential future outcomes by 
constraining the focus to the financial domain. 
An additional finding in the present study was that incremental theorists felt more certain 
than entity theorists in attaining both present (spend) and future (save) goals. This finding 
corroborates earlier evidence from a meta-analysis conducted by Burnette et al. (2013) who 
found that incremental theorists generally have higher expectations of goal success. The goal 
certainty ratings were elicited prior to the condition manipulation, however, so it is unknown if 
people may shift certainty once they think of actually pursing the goal at the expense of another. 
Additionally, it is unknown if certainty ratings might vary if experimentally induced to feel low 
or high control over goal outcomes. 
Study 4 
Thus far, we have suspected that incremental theorists might feel greater life satisfaction 
than entity theorists when sacrificing present goals for future goals, due, in part to the felt 
certainty that future outcomes will come to fruition. On the other hand, if an entity theorist feels 
less certain about future outcomes, they might feel less satisfied when they are future-focused 
because they may believe that the present sacrifices they must endure will not guarantee the 
future rewards that they are hoping for. Thus, in Study 4 we sought to explicitly manipulate felt 
certainty/controllability with respect to future goals as part of establishing a link between 
implicit theories, feelings of future goal certainty (one anticipated mechanism) and life 
satisfaction as suggested by Spencer et al. (2005). Whereas in Study 3 we found a relationship 
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between implicit theories and felt certainty of future goal achievement, in Study 4 we pilot test a 
manipulation of future controllability/certainty with the goal of examining these effects on life 
satisfaction for entity and incremental theorists. 
Similar to Study 2, we asked all participants to generate a decision that they are working 
on these days where they are sacrificing some present goal/benefit in order to achieve some 
future goal/benefit. This instruction again captures the tension involved in prioritizing one goal at 
the expense of another. Notably we only include the future goal condition in this study 
(sacrificing the present for the future) and not the converse condition (sacrificing the future for 
the present). We reasoned that, despite the finding that incremental theorists in Study 3 felt more 
certain than entity theorists even for present-oriented goals, all participants in Study 3 felt 
significantly less certain about future goals than present goal. Thus, immediate decisions may 
show less variability on certainty, whereas uncertainty is a hallmark of delayed outcomes (Green 
& Myerson, 2004). Therefore, certainty/controllability is likely to be an important mechanism 
for explaining people’s varying reactions to future goals to a greater extent than for present 
goals. 
All participants were asked to think of a goal that they are still working on and have 
decided to pursue despite the sacrifices they must make in the present. Then one third of the 
participants were asked to describe a goal that feels within their personal control and which they 
are certain it will work out. Another third of the participants were asked to describe a goal that 
feels outside of their personal control and which they feel uncertain if it will work out. The final 
third were not provided with any further instructions about controllability/uncontrollability but to 
simply describe the goal (the baseline condition).  
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Because our primary interest centers on the variable that we hypothesize may underlie the 
differences we see between entity theorists (less willingness to sacrifice for the future) and 
incremental theorists (more willingness to sacrifice for the future) and the effects this has on 
overall life satisfaction, our main prediction for this study will focus on the main effects of our 
controllability manipulation on overall life satisfaction.  
If we find that our experimental manipulation of controllability/certainty versus lack of 
control/uncertainty of future outcomes affects life satisfaction then this would provide some 
evidence for why incremental theorists might favor sacrificing present rewards for what they 
believe to be more certain outcomes and entity theorists might be less willing to do so. Thus, for 
Study 4, we hypothesize that when controllability of future outcomes is emphasized (the 
controllable condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life than when 
uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized (the lack of control condition). In Study 4, we 
do not compare a present and future condition, but examine only a future goal. Thus, we have no 
specific hypotheses for the effect of the baseline condition on participants’ overall life 
satisfaction. 
Having explained the rationale for the present study, it is important to note that this study 
was designed as an initial pilot study attempting to manipulate future controllability. The 
manipulation, however, did not successfully affect participants’ certainty perceptions; as a result,  
we altered several elements to test the same hypothesis in Study 5. This pilot study, though, also 
measured beliefs about certainty and controllability over achieving future goals (measured in this 
case – unlike Study 3 -  after participants spent time thinking about pursuing a future goal at the 
expense of a present one) and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Because these 
dependent variables did not differ by condition, we were able to assess some 
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correlational/descriptive questions in Study 4 and examine meditational models that test whether 
felt certainty/controllability of future goals accounts for the link between implicit theories and 
life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and eighty-seven participants were recruited through Crowdflower. Thirty-
three participants failed one, both, or all three attention checks and thirteen participants spent less 
than 30 seconds generating an event in which they expect to sacrifice some present goal/benefit 
for some future goal/benefit.24 In total, forty-six participants were eliminated from all analyses 
leaving 241 participants (Mage = 37.93, SD = 12.42; 145 female, 96 male).  
Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session in the 
same order as listed above (see also Appendix D).  
Measures 
Note. The full set of measures in the original study are presented in Appendix D. Only 
the measures highlighted in our analyses are described below. The means and standard 
deviations of all measures by original condition (future controllability, future – lack of control, 
and future baseline) are reported in Table 21 and the zero-order correlations among all measures 
are reported in Table 22. 
Implicit theories. As in Studies 2 and 3, implicit theories were measured using the 
Dweck (1999) implicit theory of personality measure. A composite score where higher numbers 
                                                 
24 To remain consistent with Studies 2 and 3, thirty seconds was deemed the cut-off for generating a future focused 
event. There were no participants who spent more than 1000 seconds generating their event. 
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indicate a stronger incremental theory was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of 
personality (Cronbach’s α = .96). 
Goal elicitation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three goal elicitation 
conditions: control, no control and a baseline condition. All participants were asked to think of a 
decision they are working on these days where they are sacrificing some present benefit/goal in 
order to prioritize a future benefit/goal. Within the same instructions, participants were also 
asked to choose a goal they are still working on and have decided to pursue despite the sacrifices 
that they must make in the present. In the controllable condition participants were asked to 
generate a goal that feels within their control and that they are certain will work out. In the lack 
of control condition, participants were asked to generate a goal that feels outside of their personal 
control and they are uncertain if it will work out. In the baseline condition, these last instructions 
were omitted. See Appendix D for the full script. 
Mood DV – happiness right now. Mood was captured with the same four-item measure 
as in Study 2. A composite score where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood was 
calculated (Cronbach’s α = .90). 
Life satisfaction. As in Studies 2 and 3, life satisfaction (LS) was captured by Diener’s 
measure of global life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). A composite score where higher 
numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .91). 
Specific certainty/controllability of future goal. On a Likert scale from 1(very 
uncertain that I will attain future goal/benefit) to 7(very certain that I will attain future 
goal/benefit) participants were asked “From ‘very uncertain’ to ‘very certain’ – How ‘certain’ 
are you that you will be able to attain this future benefit/goal?” Additionally, from 1(not at all 
within my control) to 7(very much within my control) participants were asked “To what degree 
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does achieving the future benefit/goal feel ‘within your control’?” The correlation between these 
two items was high; r(238) = .67, p < .001,25 thus, the two items were combined into a composite 
measure where higher numbers indicate greater feelings of certainty/controllability over the 
specific future goal; Cronbach’s α = .80. 
 Generalized beliefs about future goal attainability. On a Likert scale anchored at 
endpoints 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants were asked to rate their level of 
disagreement or agreement on three statements that were designed to capture beliefs about 
generalized future goal attainability. These three statements were: “Attaining future goals are 
almost always certain to work out,” “Since whatever will be will be, I am uncertain about future 
goals working out,” [R] and, “Future goals are certainly attainable - as long as enough sacrifices 
are made.” A composite score was created by combining the three items above such that higher 
numbers represent generalized beliefs about future goal attainability; Cronbach’s α = .65. 
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present 
for the future was the same measure used in Studies 1 through 3; Cronbach’s α = .80. 
Results and Discussion 
Central Analyses 
Manipulation Failure 
The present study was originally designed to pilot an attempt at manipulating future 
controllability. The manipulation, however, was not successful. First, an examination of specific 
goal certainty/controllability (the manipulation check) showed no differences in felt 
control/certainty between the manipulated conditions. Furthermore, when we tested our initial 
hypothesis (that manipulated controllability should increase life satisfaction compared to a lack 
                                                 
25 The correlation remained much the same when controlling for condition; r(238) = .66, p < .001. 
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of control), we found no main effects of condition when we compared all three conditions (β = 
.07, p = .27), nor when we compared just the two conditions where we expected the greatest 
difference in outcomes: the controllability and lack of control conditions (β = .02, p = .90). These 
results remained the same when we also controlled for initial life satisfaction. Finally, we 
examined the mood DV as the criterion variable and, similar to life satisfaction, no condition 
effects were found (β’s < .27, p’s > .17). To be completely thorough, we examined those initially 
low and those initially high in life satisfaction separately, and, once again, found no condition 
effects on Diener’s life satisfaction (DV); β’s < .38, p’s > .17.26 
Upon reviewing the manipulations used to elicit feelings of future controllability vs. lack 
of control, it is possible that we burdened the participants with too many criteria with which to 
follow in a single step (i.e., describe a decision to sacrifice the present for a controllable future 
goal vs. describe a decision to sacrifice the present for an uncontrollable future goal) which may 
have failed to clearly distinguish the controllability aspects of the future from the sacrifice 
decision, thereby reducing the strength of the manipulated aspect (controllability) in the 
instructions. Thus, we simplified and altered several elements of the manipulation in Study 5 to 
test the original hypothesis. 
Fortunately, and as described below in greater detail, none of the dependent measures in 
the present study differed by condition. As such we are able to proceed with correlational 
analyses and present meditational models that capture implicit theories and felt 
certainty/controllability of future goals as well as life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the 
present for the future. 
                                                 
26 Note: Among the regression analyses that we ran to examine the potential main effects of condition, none of the 
regressions produced interactions with implicit theories. 
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Preliminary Analyses 
To check the success of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit 
theories of personality and the LS pre-measure did not differ by manipulated condition. 
Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs and found that lay theories of personality did not 
differ by condition; omnibus F(2, 230) = .14, p = .87. LSD tests were used to compare the means 
between all conditions. No significant differences arose (p’s > .60). Additionally, we determined 
that that the pre-measure of life satisfaction also did not differ across conditions; omnibus F(2, 
235) = .88, p = .42, and LSD tests found no differences between conditions; p’s > .22. Refer to 
Table 21 for all comparisons. 
Did any of the dependent variables differ by condition? One-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to test if any of the dependent measures in the present study differed by condition. For 
the remainder of the analyses, we are concerned mainly with participants’ ratings of specific goal 
certainty/controllability and general certainty/controllability of future goals as well as Diener’s 
LS measure and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. No differences arose across 
conditions on Diener’s life satisfaction measure; omnibus F(2, 230) = .80, p = .45, and, LSD 
tests indicated no differences between any of the conditions (p’s > .21). Additionally, no 
differences arose across conditions on specific goal certainty/controllability; omnibus F(2, 236) 
= 1.14, p = .32, or between conditions using LSD tests (p’s > .16). Finally, LSD tests for general 
future certainty between conditions showed only a marginal difference between the baseline 
condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.06) and the controllable condition (M = 4.52, SD = .86); p = .08; 
omnibus F(2, 233) = 1.72, p = .18. Finally, we found no differences across conditions on 
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; omnibus F(2, 232) = .60, p = .55, and, LSD 
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tests indicated no differences between any of the conditions (p’s > .33); Refer to Table 21 for all 
comparisons. 
How do Entity and Incremental Theorists Differ in their Beliefs about Attainment and 
Controllability of Future Goals?  
Once we determined that our manipulation was not successful and that neither life 
satisfaction nor our measures of goal certainty/controllability differed by condition, we sought to 
examine the degree to which implicit theories are associated with future goal 
certainty/controllability as doing so helps to further characterize the nature of entity and 
incremental theorists and can provide additional understanding for why we are seeing that 
incremental theorists are more satisfied with life when they sacrifice the present for the future 
and entity theorists are more satisfied when they do not sacrifice the present for the future.  
To determine the relationship between implicit theories and future 
certainty/controllability we ran partial correlations controlling for initially assigned condition. 
Overall, implicit theories (where higher numbers indicate the incremental perspective) were 
found to be marginally correlated with specific certainty/controllability of future goal attainment; 
r(233) = .12, p = .07, and significantly correlated with general certainty of future goals; r(233) = 
.27, p < .001. Implicit theories were also found to be related to life satisfaction (DV); r(231) = 
.15, p = .02. Refer to Table 23 for all partial correlations. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
Diener’s measure of life satisfaction (measured as a dependent variable) was also significantly 
related to specific goal certainty/controllability; r(233) = .34, p < .001, and general certainty of 
future goals; r(233) = .43, p < .001. In other words, people who felt that future outcomes are 
relatively certain/controllable also felt higher in overall life satisfaction. 
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Supplemental Analyses 
Is the Relationship between Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction Mediated by Felt 
Certainty/Controllability of Future Goals? 
 In the present study, participants were asked to describe a goal in which they were 
sacrificing the present for the future and then later rate the degree to which they feel certain 
about achieving the specific goal as well as their generalized beliefs about certainty over future 
goals. As noted above, we found a correlation between implicit theories and goal certainty (both 
specific and generalized). Additionally, there was a correlation between goal certainty (both 
specific and generalized) and Diener’s life satisfaction. Thus, we tested these relationships in a 
meditational model. We used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure to test 
mediation between implicit theories, goal certainty/controllability and life satisfaction (DV). 
Implicit theories was entered as the independent variable and Diener’s life satisfaction was 
entered as the dependent variable. Two mediators were tested: specific goal 
certainty/controllability and generalized certainty of future goals. Initially assigned condition 
was controlled for in both path analyses.  
First, we examined specific goal certainty/controllability. Bootstrapping (1000 samples, 
95% confidence intervals) revealed a significant indirect effect; 95% CI [.01, .13], p < .05, 
suggesting that participants’ feelings of specific goal certainty/controllability partially mediates 
the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction.27 See Figure 10. 
Next, we examined generalized certainty of future goals. The same bootstrapping 
procedure was used and, once again, revealed a significant indirect effect; 95% CI [.05, .22], p < 
                                                 
27 We also tested the original mediation for those initially low and high in life satisfaction separately (via median 
split). Mediation by specific goal certainty emerged as non-significant for both groups 
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.05, suggesting that generalized certainty of future goals also mediates the relationship between 
implicit theories and life satisfaction.28 See Figure 11. 
Is the Relationship between Implicit Theories and Willingness to Sacrifice the Present for 
the Future Mediated by Felt Certainty/Controllability of Future Goals? 
In addition to the relationship between implicit theories and felt certainty/controllability, 
there was a correlation between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the 
future; r(232) = .25, p < .001. If felt controllability of future goals is related to higher life 
satisfaction, then felt controllability may also explain why incremental theorists are more willing 
to sacrifice the present for the future. Thus, we tested these relationships in a meditational model. 
Implicit theories was entered as the independent variable and willingness to sacrifice the present 
for the future was entered as the dependent variable. As we did with life satisfaction above, two 
mediators were tested and condition was controlled for in both path analyses.  
First, we examined specific goal certainty/controllability. The same bootstrapping 
procedure as above was used and revealed a significant indirect effect; 95% CI [.01, .10], p < 
.05, suggesting that specific goal certainty/controllability partially mediates the relationship 
between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. See Figure 12. 
The bootstrapping procedure also revealed a significant indirect effect of generalized 
certainty of future goal; 95% CI [.05, .19], p < .05, suggesting that generalized certainty of future 
goals also partially mediates the relationship between implicit theories and willingness to 
sacrifice the present for the future. See Figure 13. 
                                                 
28 We also tested the original mediation for those initially low and high in life satisfaction separately (via median 
split). Mediation by general certainty of future goals remained significant for both the low and high LS groups. 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 74 
 
Discussion 
As we have surmised, incremental theorists (vs. entity theorists) feel more certain of and 
more control over attaining specific goals and feel more certain about future goals in general. 
This may be one reason why incremental theorists feel more satisfaction with life when working 
toward future goals despite the present sacrifices they must make along the way. In contrast, 
because entity theorists feel less control over attaining future goals, this may be one reason why 
they feel little satisfaction sacrificing present rewards while working toward future goals if they 
feel less certain that future goals will work out. Indeed, we found some evidence for this 
reasoning. Not only did we find that the relationship between implicit theories and life 
satisfaction was mediated by future goal certainty, but this same process variable mediated the 
path between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; thus 
suggesting both affective consequences of long term goal pursuit (i.e., life satisfaction) for 
incremental theorists, and possibly the self-regulatory cognitions needed to actually pursue more 
long term goals (i.e., willingness to sacrifice) 
Study 5 
 The results of Study 4 suggest that incremental theorists feel more certainty and control 
over future outcomes than entity theorists do and that felt certainty/controllability is one likely 
explanation for why incremental theorists are more willing to sacrifice the present for the future 
and feel higher life satisfaction when doing so. Thus, in Study 5, we sought to, once again, 
explicitly manipulate felt controllability with respect to future goals as part of establishing a 
causal link between feelings of future goal certainty and life satisfaction as suggested by Spencer 
et al. (2005). Additionally, we will test if felt controllability causes more willingness to sacrifice 
the present for the future. 
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For Study 5, we returned to the goal elicitation methodology used in Study 2 and asked 
all participants to generate a decision that they are working on these days where they are 
sacrificing some present goal/benefit in order to achieve some future goal/benefit. This 
instruction captures the tension involved in prioritizing one goal at the expense of another. As in 
Study 4, we once again only include the future goal condition in the present study (sacrificing the 
present for the future) and not the converse condition (sacrificing the future for the present).  
After participants described the tension situation (sacrificing the present for the future), 
participants were directed to a new page where they were then randomly assigned to one of three 
manipulated conditions. One third of the participants were asked to think about and write down 
the ways that they foresee having control over how the future goal will work out (the controllable 
condition). Another third thought about and wrote down the ways they foresee not having control 
over how the future goal might work out (the lack of control condition). Finally, another third of 
participants (those in the baseline condition) did not elaborate on goal controllability or 
uncontrollability. We expect that separating the goal elicitation from the controllability 
manipulation will allow the controllability manipulation to become more salient, and thus, a 
more powerful manipulation.  
As in Study 4, we again focus on the main effects of our controllability manipulation and 
hypothesize that when controllability of future outcomes is emphasized (the controllable 
condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life and a greater willingness to 
sacrifice the present for the future than when uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized 
(the lack of control condition). Once again, we have no specific hypotheses for the effect of the 
baseline condition on participants’ overall life satisfaction.  
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In addition, we measured two dependent variables previously shown to be related to life 
satisfaction and to beliefs about the future: optimism (Busseri, Choma, & Sadava, 2009) and 
pessimism (Chang, Maydeu-Oivares, & D’Zurilla, 1997). Similar to our expected outcomes of 
un/controllability on life satisfaction, we expect that participants will indicate higher optimism 
and lower pessimism when future goal controllability is emphasized than when future goal 
uncontrollability is emphasized. 
Method 
Participants 
Four hundred and eighteen participants were recruited through Mturk. Thirty-nine 
participants failed one, both, or all three attention checks and twenty-eight participants spent less 
than 30 seconds generating an event in which they expect to sacrifice some present goal/benefit 
for some future goal/benefit.29 In total, sixty-seven participants were eliminated from all analyses 
leaving 351 participants (Mage = 38.71, SD = 13.62; 199 female, 151 male, and 1 undisclosed).  
Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session in the 
same order as listed below (see also Appendix E). 
Measures 
Life Satisfaction and mood pre-measures. Life satisfaction and mood were pre-
measured the same as Studies 2 through 4. 
Implicit theories. As in Studies 2 through 4, implicit theories were measured using the 
Dweck (1999) implicit theory of personality measure. A composite score where higher numbers 
                                                 
29 To remain consistent with Studies 2, 3 and 4, thirty seconds was deemed the cut-off for generating a future 
focused event. There were no participants who spent more than 1000 seconds generating their event. 
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indicate a stronger incremental theory was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of 
personality (Cronbach’s α = .96). 
Goal elicitation. Similar to Study 2, participants were asked to think of a decision that 
they are working on these days where they are sacrificing some present benefit/goal in order to 
prioritize a future benefit/goal and briefly describe the decision. Recall that in Study 2, we asked 
participants to “think of a decision that they are working on these days – or worked on recently . 
. .” whereas in the present study, we eliminated the words “or worked on recently” as we wanted 
participants to stay focused on a future mindset wherein they would likely still be on the path to 
fulfilling some future goal/desire.  
Controllability Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to think about and 
write down the ways they foresee having control over how the future goal will work out 
(controllable condition) or the ways they foresee not having control over how the future goal 
might work out (lack of control condition). Participants read a preamble designed to encourage 
them to think of the future as either certain/controllable or uncertain/uncontrollable. It was 
noted: “as you work toward this goal, recall that the future is actually [more controllable/less 
controllable] than we sometimes realize, so, we can [often be pretty certain/never be certain] that 
the goals we are aiming for will work out, [given/despite] the sacrifices we make in the present.” 
Then, participants were asked to “think about how the future benefit/goal is [relatively 
certain/uncertain] to work out and write down the ways that you [foresee having control/don’t 
have control] over how it will work out.”  
Life satisfaction. As in Studies 2 through 4, life satisfaction (LS) was captured by 
Diener’s measure of global life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). A composite score where 
higher numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .93). 
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Goal importance. Following the dependent variable measure of life satisfaction 
participants were asked to rate the importance of both the present goal and the future goal (i.e., 
the present vs. future goal pitted against each other during the tension manipulation) generated 
during goal elicitation. On a 7-point Likert scale anchored at endpoints 1(not at all important) to 
7(extremely important), participants were asked, “Please indicate how important the present 
benefit/goal is to you in general.” and “Please indicate how important the future benefit/goal is to 
you in general.” 
Goal Progress. Participants were asked to indicate how far along they are in attaining the 
future goal they wrote about in the goal elicitation procedure. On an 8-point Likert scale from 
0(have not started yet), to 1(just beginning) to 7(almost completed), participants were asked to 
indicate their response to the following question: “From 'just beginning' to 'almost completed' - 
Approximately how far along are you in trying to attain this future benefit/goal?  If you have not 
started pursuing this goal yet, indicate ‘have not started yet.’” 
Specific certainty/controllability of future goal. Specific goal certainty and goal 
controllability were measured the same as in Study 4. These items were highly correlated; r(342) 
= .64, p < .001, and were thus combined to create a composite measure; Cronbach’s α = .78. 
 Generalized beliefs about future goal attainability. Generalized beliefs about future 
goal attainability were measured using the same 3 items as in Study 4; Cronbach’s α = .62.  
Optimism and Pessimism. We were interested in further characterizing the degree to 
which feelings of future goal controllability versus uncontrollability influence feelings of 
pessimism and optimism. As one might expect, pessimism is typically found to be strongly and 
negatively related to life satisfaction (Chang, et al., 1997) and optimism is found to be strongly 
associated with life satisfaction (Busseri, et al., 2009). To measure optimism (a generally 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 79 
 
positive outlook on the future), we used a shortened version of Scheier and Carver’s (1985) Life 
Orientation Scale. From 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants completed a 3-
item measure that included statements such as “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best,” and 
“If something can go wrong for me, it will,”[R]; α = .82. To capture pessimism (a generally 
negative outlook on the future), we used a shortened version of Hayes et al.’s (2015) measure of 
pessimism. From 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants completed a 4-item 
measure that included statements such as: “There is no guarantee that working hard will get you 
the future rewards that you hope for,” “I feel like society doesn’t have very much to offer me,” 
and “I know that if I work hard now I will benefit from it in the future,” [R]; Cronbach’s α = .74. 
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present 
for the future was the same measure used in Studies 1 through 4; Cronbach’s α = .80. 
 Sacrifice the Present – One vs. many instances? Finally, we were curious about how 
participants characterize present sacrifices while working toward future goals/rewards. Whereas 
the goal-regulation literature (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2007) often examines the “snapshot” 
moment of how people self-regulate in the face of one temptation (e.g., pass up a tempting 
doughnut) in pursuit of a long term goal (e.g., a diet/health goal), we were curious if when 
people think about the sacrifice involved in pursuit of a future goal/reward, they may bring to 
mind multiple sacrifices that must be made over a span of time (e.g., pass up all future tempting 
doughnuts). We were interested in characterizing the ways people thought about the present 
sacrifice (as one or many) relative to the future goal. . Participants first read a preamble that 
stated, “For today's exercise . . . when you thought about giving up a present goal/benefit - would 
you say this is a ‘one time’ sacrifice? OR, is it about giving up ‘several’ immediate rewards? -- 
i.e., making many immediate sacrifices over time on the way to the future goal/benefit.” Then on 
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a Likert scale from 1(one time sacrifice) to 5(many sacrifices over time) participants answered 
the  question “On the scale below, to what degree did "sacrificing" the present represent a 'one 
time' sacrifice versus 'many sacrifices' over time?” We have no specific hypotheses about this 
item. The answers to this question will be examined for descriptive exploration only. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall that for Study 5, we hypothesized that when controllability of future outcomes is 
emphasized (the controllable condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life 
and greater willingness to sacrifice the present for the future than when uncontrollability of 
future outcomes is emphasized (the lack of control condition). We had no specific predictions for 
the baseline condition. 
Central Analyses 
Preliminary Analyses 
As a test of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit theories of 
personality, initial mood and initial life satisfaction did not differ by condition. We ran one-way 
ANOVAs with condition (lack of control, baseline and controllable; effect coded -1, 0, 1) as the 
fixed factor and treated initial life satisfaction, initial mood and implicit theories as dependent 
variables. No differences across conditions arose for either of the variables; omnibus F’s < 1.18, 
p’s > .31. LSD tests were used to compare the means between all conditions on each of the 
variables. No significant differences arose between conditions for any of the variables (p’s > 
.15).30 The means and standard deviations of all measures across the three conditions are 
reported in Table 24. 
                                                 
30 We also regressed condition and implicit theories onto initial life satisfaction and also onto initial mood and found 
no interactions; β’s < .02, p’s > .72. 
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Goal Importance. First, we compared the goal importance ratings for present and future 
goals (a within-subjects comparison) by manipulated condition in a repeated measures 
multivariate analysis. Recall that participants were asked to describe a decision where they are 
sacrificing a present goal in pursuit of a future goal. Not surprisingly, we found that overall, 
future goals (M = 6.33, SD = .91) were rated as more important than present goals (M = 5.22, SD 
= 1.49); F(1, 340) = 186.49, p < .001, η2 = .35. Additionally, a condition x present/future 
comparison interaction emerged significant; omnibus F(1, 340) = 3.77, p = .024, η2 = .02. In 
order to test potential differences between conditions, we first created difference scores whereby 
we subtracted present importance ratings from future importance ratings and entered this variable 
as the dependent variable in a one-way ANOVA. First, descriptive statistics showed that future 
goals were rated more important than present goals across all conditions. LSD tests revealed that 
there was a significant difference between the baseline condition (M = .873, SD = 1.43) and the 
controllable condition (M = 1.41, SD = 1.51); p = .007, suggesting that participants in the 
controllable condition rated their future goals as significantly more important than present goals 
compared to participants in the baseline condition. There was a marginal difference between the 
lack of control condition (M = 1.04, SD = 1.49) and controllable condition; p = .07, also 
suggesting that in the controllable condition participants rated future goals as more important 
than present goals compared to participants in the lack of control condition. There was no 
difference between the lack of control condition and the baseline condition; p =.40. Additionally, 
we regressed both implicit theories and all condition comparisons (using two dummy variables 
reflecting a comparison of the controllable condition and the lack of control condition to the 
baseline condition, and, a comparison of the baseline and the controllable conditions to the lack 
of control condition) onto the ‘difference in importance’ variable as the criterion. Results for 
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condition mirrored those found in the ANOVA analysis. Furthermore, there was no interaction 
with implicit theories (p’s > .23). Overall, participants rated future goals as more important than 
present ones when future goal controllability was emphasized (vs. lack of control and baseline) 
and these differences did not differ for entity or incremental theorists. 
We also examined importance ratings separately with implicit theories as a possible 
moderator. Looking only at importance ratings of present goals, we first examined present 
importance ratings by condition. An omnibus ANOVA revealed no effect of condition on present 
importance ratings, F(2, 340) = 1.40, p = .27. Furthermore, LSD tests revealed no differences 
between any of the conditions, p’s >.15. Additionally, we regressed both implicit theories and all 
condition comparisons (using the dummy variables) onto present importance as the criterion 
variable. Results for condition mirrored those found in the ANOVA analysis. Furthermore, there 
was no interaction with implicit theories (p’s > .16). 
We also examined future importance ratings by condition. An omnibus ANOVA revealed 
an overall marginal effect of condition; F(2, 341) = 2.86, p =  .06, η2 = .02. LSD tests revealed 
that participants ranked their future goal as more important in the controllable condition (M = 
6.45, SD = .70) than in the baseline condition (M = 6.17, SD = 1.09); p = .02 but not more 
important than the lack of control condition (M = 6.37, SD = .85); p = .52. The baseline and lack 
of control conditions were marginally different; p = .10. We then regressed both implicit theories 
and condition (using the dummy variables) onto future importance as the criterion variable. 
Results for condition mirrored those found in the ANOVA analysis and there was no interaction 
with implicit theories (p’s > .29). 
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Finally, we examined participants’ goal progress by condition. An omnibus ANOVA  
revealed an overall effect of condition; F(2, 341) = 5.11, p = .006, η2 = .03. LSD31 tests revealed 
that in the controllable condition; i.e., when they wrote about the ways in which they have 
control over how the goal might work out, participants reported being further along in their goals 
(M = 4.87, SD = 2.03) than in the baseline condition (M = 4.28, SD = 2.13); p = .02. Similarly, 
when participants wrote about the many ways in which they have no control over how the goal 
might work out (i.e., the lack of control condition) they also reported higher goal progress (M = 
5.08, SD = 2.28) than in the baseline condition. Because both the controllable and lack of control 
conditions were rated as higher in goal progress than baseline, it is possible that simply by asking 
participants to elaborate on the steps they could take in pursuing the long term goal this activated 
a sense that the goal was also further along regardless of goal controllability. Importantly, goal 
progress did not differ between our main conditions of interest in the present study: the 
controllable condition and the lack of control condition; p = .55. It is worth keeping in mind that 
when people do not elaborate on how they might achieve the goal (as was the case in the baseline 
condition) they may be qualitatively different from the two experimental conditions that shared a 
more common method.  
Manipulation Checks 
Specific certainty/controllability of future goal. To determine if the manipulation had 
its desired effect, we examined participants’ ratings for specific goal attainability and goal-
specific feelings of control over the goal. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
                                                 
31 Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. For each regression, implicit theories and the dummy 
variables were entered in Step 1 and the interaction term for implicit theories and each dummy was entered in Step 
2. Regression analyses confirmed the between condition comparisons as found in the univariate tests noted above 
when goal progress was the criterion. Furthermore, there were no interactions between implicit theories and any of 
the condition comparisons; p’s > .79. 
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condition on specific goal attainability, F(2, 341) = 8.77, p < .001, η2 = .05. LSD32 tests revealed 
that as expected, participants felt that their specific goal was more certain/controllable in the 
controllable condition (M = 5.87, SD = 1.09) than in the baseline condition (M = 5.51, SD = 
1.37); p = .03, and the lack of control condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.27); p < .001. Furthermore, 
participants felt more certain/control of their specific goal in the baseline condition than in the 
lack of control condition; p = .04. In sum, our controllability manipulation seems to have had its 
desired effects. 
Generalized beliefs about future goal attainability. Similar to specific goal 
attainability, we were curious if the controllability manipulation affected participants’ 
generalized certainty of future goals. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
condition on generalized certainty of future goals, F(2, 330) = 7.11, p = .001, η2 = .04. LSD33 
tests revealed that participants felt more certain about attaining goals in general in the 
controllable condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.02) than in the baseline condition (M = 4.62, SD = 
1.12); p = .012, and the lack of control condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.03); p < .001. There were no 
differences between the baseline and the lack of control conditions; p = .22. 
Do Feelings of Control over Future Goals vs. Lack of Control affect Life Satisfaction and 
Willingness to Sacrifice the Present for the Future? 
Life Satisfaction. For the present study, we sought to explicitly manipulate felt 
controllability with respect to future goals as part of establishing a link between feelings of 
future goal controllability and life satisfaction. Recall that in Studies 3 and 4 we found a 
relationship between implicit theories and felt certainty/controllability of future goals, therefore, 
                                                 
32 Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Furthermore, implicit theories did not interact with 
any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .15. 
33 Similar to the other manipulation checks, regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Implicit 
theories did not interact with any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .65.   
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in Study 5 we manipulated feelings of future controllability as one means of providing evidence 
of a causal link between felt controllability of future outcomes and overall life satisfaction (e.g., 
Spencer et al., 2005). We hypothesized that when controllability of future outcomes is 
emphasized (the controllable condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life 
than when uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized (the lack of control condition). We 
had no specific hypotheses for the baseline condition. 
First, we ran a one-way ANOVA to examine life satisfaction ratings (our dependent 
measure) by condition (lack of control, baseline, and controllable; effect coded -1, 0 1) to 
determine if there were any differences in life satisfaction ratings by condition. An omnibus 
ANOVA did not reveal a significant effect of condition on life satisfaction, F(2, 348) = 1.66, p = 
.19, η2 = .01. However, LSD34 tests revealed a marginal difference in life satisfaction between 
the lack of control and controllable conditions; the conditions that we hypothesized would show 
the greatest contrast. Participants expressed higher satisfaction with life when future goal 
controllability was made salient (M = 4.55, SD = 1.56) than when lack of control was made 
salient (M = 4.15, SD = 1.58); p = .09. Life satisfaction ratings did not differ between the 
controllable and the baseline condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.55); p = .15, nor did the baseline 
condition differ from the lack of control condition; p = .76.35 Although marginal, the difference 
between the controllable and lack of control condition (the two conditions where we expected to 
see most of the action) suggests that our manipulation of control over future goals had somewhat 
of an effect on participants’ overall life satisfaction ratings. These findings provide some 
                                                 
34 An omnibus ANOVA with LSD tests (where the difference between present goal importance versus future goal 
importance was entered as a control variable) produced the same results. 
35 When the mood DV (measured just prior to Diener’s LS) was tested as the dependent variable a significant effect 
of condition emerged; omnibus ANOVA F(2, 341) = 3.42, p = .034. LSD tests revealed that participants were 
happier in the controllable condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.57) than in the lack of control condition (M = 4.47, SD = 
1.61); p = .02, and the baseline condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.65); p = .04. There were no differences between the 
baseline and lack of control conditions; p = .71. 
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preliminary (although weak) evidence in establishing a causal link between feelings of future 
control and life satisfaction. 
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Similar to the above analyses, we 
were interested in determining if the control manipulation had the anticipated effect on 
participants’ willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. An omnibus ANOVA revealed no 
overall effect of condition, F(2, 329) = 1.99, p = .14, η2 = .01. LSD36 tests however, revealed that 
participants were marginally more willing to sacrifice the present for the future in the 
controllable condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.13) than in the lack of control condition (M = 4.72, SD 
= 1.07); p = .07, and also in the baseline condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.27); p = .10. There were no 
differences between the lack of control and baseline conditions; p = .80. Similar to the findings 
above with life satisfaction, these findings provide preliminary (although weak) evidence in 
establishing a causal link between feelings of future control and willingness to sacrifice the 
present for the future. 
Do Feelings of Control over Future Goals vs. Lack of Control affect Optimism or 
Pessimism? 
Optimism and pessimism are usually found to be strongly correlated with life satisfaction 
(Busseri et al., 2009; Chang et al., 1997). The findings of the present study confirm this: 
optimism and life satisfaction (LS) are strongly positively correlated; r(334) = .63, p < .001, and 
pessimism is strongly negatively correlated with LS; r(334) = -.50, p < .001. We speculated that 
the controllability manipulation would affect optimism and pessimism, both because the 
manipulation altered anticipated future outcomes, and because these variables are so connected 
                                                 
36 Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Moreover, implicit theories did not interact with 
condition; p’s > .11. 
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to life satisfaction.Thus, and similar to the main analyses above, we examined optimism and 
pessimism as additional dependent variables.  
Starting with optimism, an omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition 
(coded -1, 0, 1) on optimism, F(2, 332) = 2.98, p = .05, η2 = .01. LSD37 tests revealed that 
participants were significantly more optimistic in the controllable condition (M = 4.70, SD = 
1.33) than in the lack of control condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.41); p = .016, however there was no 
difference between the controllable condition and the baseline condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.41); 
p = .12. Furthermore, there was no difference between the baseline and lack of control condition; 
p = .37. 
Next we examined pessimism. Similar to optimism, an omnibus ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of condition (coded -1, 0, 1) on pessimism, F(2,332) = 4.02, p = .02, η2 = .02. 
Also similar to optimism, LSD38 tests revealed that participants were significantly more 
pessimistic in the lack of control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.20) than in the controllable 
condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.21); p = .007, but not more than in the baseline condition (M = 3.70, 
SD = 1.19); p = .46. Additionally, participants were less pessimistic in the baseline condition 
than in the controllable condition; p = .04. 
Overall, the results for optimism and pessimism informatively complement the outcomes 
of our controllability manipulation on life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the present for 
the future.  
                                                 
37 Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Additionally, implicit theories did not interact with 
any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .20.   
38 Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Additionally, implicit theories did not interact with 
any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .39.   
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Supplemental Analyses 
Did Implicit Theories Play a Role in Response to the Control vs. No Control Manipulation? 
 We sought to alter the psychological experience of future certainty/controllability (which 
we found to vary by implicit theories in Studies 3 & 4), thus we may not see an effect of implicit 
theories. However, it is still possible that the role of implicit theories would continue to be 
visible. If differences are found between how entity and incremental theorists reacted to the 
controllability vs. lack of control manipulation, it may help to elucidate why the direct 
relationship between manipulated control and life satisfaction was only marginal.  
 To examine this more directly, we used regression analyses. We entered condition (lack 
of control, baseline, controllable; effect coded -1, 0, 1) and implicit theories (mean centered) in 
Step 1, and the interaction term in Step 2 predicting Diener’s life satisfaction as the criterion 
variable. The main effect of condition emerged as nearing marginal; b = .17, β = .08, p = .11, 
95% CI = [-.04, .38], however this is an omnibus effect of condition, rather than a comparison 
between conditions.39 Additionally, there was a main effect of implicit theories; b = .17, β = .12, 
p = .02, 95% CI = [.03, .31], suggesting that incremental theorists were more satisfied with life 
overall than entity theorists (at least in the context of thinking about future goals, which was the 
case for all conditions in Study 5). However, there was no interaction between condition and 
implicit theories; p = .29. See Table 26 for β and t values for all predictor variables. 
 We wondered, if, similar to Study 3, the effects of the manipulation might interact with 
implicit theories on life satisfaction differentially for those who are initially low versus high in 
life satisfaction. As such, we entered initial life satisfaction as an additional moderator in the 
                                                 
39 When condition was broken down into two sets of dummy variables and examined in regressions with implicit 
theories, only the comparison between the no control and control condition emerged as nearing marginal, b = .33, β 
= .10, p = .12. Implicit theories did not interact with any of the condition comparisons, p’s > .31. 
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regression analysis. The omnibus regression did not produce a significant 3-way interaction 
between condition, implicit theories and initial life satisfaction; b = -.03, β = -.04, p = .18, 95% 
CI = [-.06, .01]. See Table 27 for β and t values for all predictor variables.40 
 For the sake of due diligence, and to replicate our analysis strategy of Study 3, we opted 
to examine separately those initially low and initially high on life satisfaction to see if implicit 
theories might have interacted with the effects of our manipulation. Thus, we re-ran the 
regression analyses examining condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable; coded -1, 0, 1) x 
implicit theories on life satisfaction DV for those low and high in initial life satisfaction. Not 
surprisingly, and similar to Study 3, all of the action was found to be within the participants who 
were initially low in life satisfaction. Results showed a main effect of condition; b = .28, β = .17, 
p = .02, 95% CI = [.04, .51] suggesting that there is a significant difference on life satisfaction 
between at least two of the conditions. Additionally, there was a main effect of implicit theories; 
b = .24, β = .21, p = .005, 95% CI = [.07, .41], suggesting that, for those initially low in life 
satisfaction, incremental theorists reported feeling more satisfied with life than entity theorists. 
However, the main effects were qualified by a significant interaction; b = .25, β = .17, p = .025, 
95% CI = [.03, .48].41 See Figure 14.  
For those initially high in life satisfaction, results of the regression analysis show neither 
an effect of condition; p = .33, nor an interaction; p = .37,42 however, similar to those initially 
low in life satisfaction a main effect of implicit theories emerged as significant; b = .13, β = .17, 
                                                 
40 When condition was broken down into two sets of dummy variables and examined in regressions with implicit 
theories and initial life satisfaction one of the condition contrasts produced a marginal interaction with implicit 
theories and initial life satisfaction – the contrast between baseline and the control condition; b = -.06, β = -.07, p = 
.09. None of the other 3-way interactions were significant; p’s > .22. 
41 The interaction between condition and implicit theories remained significant for those initially low in life 
satisfaction when controlling for Mood (DV); b = .19, β = .12, p = .047, 95% CI = [.00, .37]. 
42 Results for the initially high satisfaction group remained non-significant when controlling for Mood (DV) in the 
regression. 
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p = .023, 95% CI = [.02, .24], once again suggesting that for those initially high in life 
satisfaction, incremental theorists reported feeling more satisfied than entity theorists overall. 
See figure 11. 
 To better examine the effects of our three conditions, we created two sets of dummy 
variables that allowed us to determine which of the condition contrasts interacted with implicit 
theories predicting life satisfaction. In order to test all of the condition contrasts, two regressions 
were run for each group initially low and high in life satisfaction separately. In Step 1 of 
regression 1, we entered one pair of condition dummy variables and implicit theories (mean 
centered). In Step 2, we entered the interactions of each dummy variable and implicit theories. 
For regression 2, we used the second pair of condition dummy variables in the same manner. 
 The low life satisfaction group. For those initially low in life satisfaction, we found a 
significant condition effect between the lack of control and controllable conditions; b = .54, β = 
.20, p = .026, 95% CI = [.07, 1.02]. Additionally, there was an interaction between the lack of 
control and controllable contrast and implicit theories; b = .50, β = .24, p = .03, 95% CI = [.05, 
.94]. There was also an interaction between the baseline and controllable contrast and implicit 
theories; b = .40, β = .20, p = .05, 95% CI = [.01, .80]. There were no other condition effects or 
interactions; p’s > .17. See Table 28 for β and t values for all predictor variables for both 
regressions. 
Next, for those initially low in life satisfaction, we examined the interaction pattern in 
regression analysis by examining the simple slopes of each condition contrast and the simple 
effects of implicit theories at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the 
implicit theories variable. As noted earlier, we anticipated overall, that the controllable 
manipulation encouraging participants to write about a number ways in which their future goal 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 91 
 
was under their control (i.e., the controllable condition), that entity theorists would not differ in 
ratings of life satisfaction ratings from that of incremental theorists. For those initially low in life 
satisfaction, however, this was not the case. In the controllable condition, incremental theorists 
reported significantly greater life satisfaction than entity theorists; b = .55, β = .47, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [.26, .85], but did not differ from entity theorists in the baseline condition; p = .28, or the 
lack of control condition; p = .71. Indeed, entity theorists did not differ in their life satisfaction 
ratings across any of the conditions; p’s > 68. Incremental theorists, on the other hand, did have 
higher life satisfaction between the controllable and lack of control condition; b = 1.12, β = .44, p 
= .002, 95% CI = [.44, 1.80], and between the control and baseline condition; b = .79, β = .29, p 
= .02, 95% CI = [.12, 1.45]. Similarly, there was no difference between the baseline and lack of 
control condition; p = .32. 
The high life satisfaction group. Similar to those initially low in life satisfaction, we 
first tested contrasts between all conditions, implicit theories and their interactions in regression 
analyses for the group initially high in life satisfaction. No condition effects or interactions 
emerged as significant; p’s > .25. See Table 29 for β and t values for all predictor variables for 
both regressions. 
Simple effects tests revealed that incremental theorists were marginally more satisfied 
with life in the baseline condition; b = .18, β = .23, p = .09, 95% CI = [-.03, .38], which mirrors 
the effects found in Study 3 (also a focus on the future). Similarly, incremental theorists were 
also marginally more satisfied with life than entity theorists in the lack of control condition; b = 
.17, β = .23, p = .09, 95% CI = [-.03, .37]. Similar to those low in life satisfaction, there were no 
differences between the baseline and lack of control condition for entity or incremental theorists; 
p’s > .86.  
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In line with our initial predictions about how feelings of future control should increase 
life satisfaction for both theory holders, entity and incremental theorists did not differ in life 
satisfaction in the controllable condition; b = .05, β = .06, p = .62, 95% CI = [-.14, .23]. Thus, 
when encouraged to contemplate a number of ways that future goals are controllable, entity 
theorists seemingly were just as satisfied with life as incremental theorists whereas, in Studies 1 
and 3 (when feelings of control were not made salient), entity theorists were much less satisfied 
when sacrificing the present for the future. Finally for those initially high on LS, entity theorists 
did not differ in life satisfaction between the controllable and lack of control contrast; p = .17, or 
the controllable and baseline condition; p = 15. 
Sacrifice the present – One vs. many instances? Finally, we were curious about how 
participants characterized present sacrifices while working toward future goals/rewards. We 
wondered if, when people think about sacrificing a present goal/reward in pursuit of a future 
goal/reward they may contemplate several sacrifices that must be made.  We examine the 
answers to this one-item measure with the understanding that the study was in no way structured 
around answering this particular question. Indeed, the interest in this item is driven by curiosity, 
and by examining it with an eye for descriptive information. Results will, at the very least answer 
the basic question: When people in the present study thought about sacrificing the present for the 
future, were they imagining just one moment of sacrifice in the present or were they imagining 
many moments of having to sacrifice the present? 
To examine this question, we first looked at basic descriptive information. Recall that we 
asked participants to indicate their response on a scale from 1(one time sacrifice) to 5(many 
sacrifices over time). The mean on this item was 3.80 with a SD of 1.34 indicating that when 
participants spoke of a future goal that they were sacrificing present rewards for, there was a 
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propensity toward believing that many present sacrifices would be had over time in pursuit of 
their future goal. Indeed, the mean on this item differed significantly from 1 (one time sacrifice); 
t(326) = 37.78, p < .001; See Figure 16 for answer frequency histogram. 
Then we examined correlations with the ‘one vs. many instances’ item and found that 
there was no relationship with implicit theories r(327) = .03, however there was a small negative 
relationship with life satisfaction (DV); r(327) = -.16, and the pre-measure of life satisfaction; 
r(327) = -.17, such that more sacrifices was related to lower life satisfaction (See Table 25 for 
intercorrelations among all of the variables). Next, we examined this item to see if it differed 
between conditions. An omnibus ANOVA revealed no differences among the lack of control, 
baseline and controllable conditions, F(2, 324) = .62, p = .54. LSD43 tests revealed that 
participants felt they were sacrificing about the same number of present moments in the 
controllable condition (M = 3.91, SD = 1.26) as they did in the baseline condition (M = 3.71, SD 
= 1.44); p = .27, and the lack of control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.31); p = .56. There were 
also no differences between baseline and lack of control; p = .60. 
Discussion 
 The present study manipulated felt controllability of future goals as part of establishing a 
link between feelings of future goal controllability and life satisfaction as well as willingness to 
sacrifice the present for the future as suggested by Spencer et al. (2005). We hypothesized that 
when controllability of future outcomes was emphasized, participants would indicate higher life 
satisfaction and a greater willingness to sacrifice the present for the future than when 
uncontrollability was emphasized.  
                                                 
43 Regression analyses confirmed the between condition comparisons as found in the univariate test noted above. 
Furthermore, implicit theories did not interact with any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .14. 
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 Although condition differences for both life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the 
present for the future were marginal, the findings provide some preliminary evidence of our 
causal hypothesis, suggesting that feelings of future controllability may affect both an affective 
component (i.e., feeling satisfied with one’s life) and the self-regulatory cognitions needed to 
engage in long-term goal pursuits.  
Additionally, we found corroborating evidence with our findings for optimism and 
pessimism between the controllable and lack of control conditions; variables that are highly 
related to life satisfaction. Optimism increased with the controllability manipulation and 
pessimism decreased. Thus, we feel confident in suggesting that some of the differences found in 
life satisfaction and a willingness to sacrifice the present for the future between entity and 
incremental theorists is due, in part, to feelings of control (for incremental theorists) or the lack 
thereof (for entity theorists). Initial mood, future goal importance (and present goal importance), 
as well as goal progress did not differ between the lack of control and controllable conditions, 
therefore, did not have a direct impact on the results, further supporting our contention that the 
results were, in fact, due to the controllability manipulation. 
 It is worthwhile to note that, for those initially low in life satisfaction, entity theorists 
were significantly less satisfied with life (the DV) in the controllable condition than incremental 
theorists. In fact, entity theorists did not differ on the dependent measure of LS between any of 
the conditions. We wondered if perhaps entity theorists in this group were not convinced by the 
controllable manipulation (i.e., that future goals can be controlled). Looking back to our earlier 
examination of the manipulation checks, however, where we asked about the degree to which 
participants felt that achieving the future goal felt within their control, we found only the 
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expected main effects of condition and no interactions with implicit theories.44 It would appear, 
then, that entity theorists felt as much control over their future goal (in the controllable 
condition) as incremental theorists did. It is possible then, that even though entity theorists felt 
control over their future goal, this did not necessarily make them feel satisfied about it. In 
contrast, the entity theorists who were initially high in life satisfaction were just as satisfied as 
incremental theorists, which is what we predicted our controllable manipulation would do in our 
initial hypotheses. We elaborate on these findings more in the general discussion below. 
 Finally, we also learned in the present study that when participants were asked to 
describe future goals/rewards they hope to achieve that required sacrificing in the present that the 
present sacrifices were reported to be, on average, more than just a single sacrifice. In other 
words, most participants indicated that it was not just one sacrifice or temptation that they must 
give up in the present in service of future goals, but several present goals/rewards that they must 
sacrifice in this pursuit. This is meaningful because when people find themselves in real world 
self-regulatory conflicts they may consider complex tensions between immediate and future 
benefits that may involve not only a single instance of sacrifice, but repeated and sustained effort 
in pursuit of a future goal that may vary on certainty.  
General Discussion 
Overview of Findings 
We have proposed that incremental theorists, who believe that attributes are malleable 
and can change and develop over time, should feel more satisfied with life when prioritizing 
                                                 
44 To be completely thorough, we went back to the regression analysis for the manipulation checks to see if there 
were any interactions between any of the condition contrasts and implicit theories for those low in initial life 
satisfaction and those high in initial life satisfaction on goal controllability. No interactions emerged as significant; 
the lowest of which was the interaction between implicit theories and the baseline/no control comparison; p = .12. 
The rest of the interactions had p’s > .28. 
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future goals over present ones and entity theorists, who believe that attributes are relatively 
stable over time, should feel more satisfied prioritizing immediate goals over future ones. We 
demonstrated this pattern correlationally (Study 1) and experimentally (Study 3), noting that the 
effects may be especially likely to emerge among those who are lower in initial life satisfaction 
(Study 3).  
We propose that this pattern may occur, at least in part, because incremental theorists are 
more certain they can control, and, thus achieve their future goals – making it more palatable to 
sacrifice current pleasure in pursuit of these rather certain future benefits. In Study 4 we showed 
that incremental theorists do feel more certain they can achieve future goals relative to entity 
theorists. Moreover, future goal certainty (both specific goal certainty and generalized feelings of 
future certainty) mediated the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction, as well 
as the relation between implicit theories and the willingness to sacrifice the present for the future.  
Finally, in Study 5 we manipulated this proposed mediator by attempting to make people feel 
more (or less) control over future outcomes. We expected that, paralleling incremental and entity 
theorists’ natural tendencies, leading people to feel control over future goal outcomes should 
cause them to be more satisfied with life - and more willing to sacrifice the present for the future 
- relative to those who feel uncertain about future goals. Overall, future goal certainty did have a 
small effect: those led to think of how a goal outcome was controllable and more certain reported 
(marginally) more satisfaction with life and (marginally) more willingness to sacrifice for the 
future than those who thought of the ways the goal outcome was uncontrollable and uncertain. 
However, further exploration revealed that the effect was most pronounced for incremental 
theorists with lower initial life satisfaction, whereas entity theorists with low life satisfaction 
showed no evidence of increased satisfaction when goals were framed as controllable. This may 
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mean that entity theorists (especially those lower in current life satisfaction) are less likely to 
base life satisfaction on future goals, whether they viewed them as controllable or not. Indeed, it 
is possible that our proposed mediator of “controllability” (tested in Studies 4 & 5) may be more 
applicable to future (rather than present) goals. Taking this one step further, it is possible that 
there is something about the psychology of immediate goals that more strongly influences entity 
theorists. If this is the case, there may be an additional unmeasured mediator accounting for 
reactions to immediate goals.  
 Overall, the findings suggest that implicit theories of change and stability importantly 
moderate the satisfaction in life that people may feel when deciding whether to live for today or 
sacrifice immediate gains to pursue their future and that this relationship is, in part, mediated by 
feelings of certainty about and control over future outcomes - but that there may be additional 
mechanisms other than perceived control accounting for variations in participants’ responses, 
especially in the present goal condition. .  
Additionally, we discovered a potential boundary condition for these effects (as was seen 
in Studies 3 & 5); namely, that the effects were stronger (or only in evidence) for those initially 
low in life satisfaction. It is possible that we encountered ceiling effects for those already high in 
life satisfaction at the onset. In other words, people already very satisfied with life might not shift 
their life satisfaction easily: They are less likely to increase in LS from an already high starting 
point; similarly, they may also be more impervious to temporary declines. It is plausible that 
single goal elicitations or temporary controllability manipulations are not enough to perturb an 
already highly satisfied state.  
 Based on our reasoning that people should be less satisfied if they feel less control over 
future outcomes, we would anticipate, then, that most of the action (i.e., the least satisfaction) 
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would occur in the situation where people feel most uncertain about the outcomes – which is 
what we found for entity theorists when we examined the simple effects in studies 1 and 3. 
Indeed, we found that entity theorists were less satisfied when sacrificing the present for the 
future (than the reverse), and, when in the future focused condition (sacrificing the present), 
entity theorists were less satisfied than incremental theorists. 
The evidence is less consistent for incremental theorists. In Study 3 incremental theorists 
did not feel more life satisfaction in the future focus condition than in the present focus 
condition; suggesting that incremental theorists might be o.k. with either temporal focus. 
Additionally, incremental theorists did not show evidence of feeling less LS than entity theorists 
in the present focused condition in Study 3. Study 3 found some preliminary evidence that 
incremental theorists might feel more control (than entity theorists) over both present goals and 
future goals, however this measure was assessed prior to goal elicitation (i.e., prior to goal 
deliberation). Overall, we are not inclined to see the results for incremental theorists as 
problematic for our overall theorizing as we saw the same pattern of results across the first three 
studies. 
 Going back to Study 1, we did find that incremental theorists reported lower life 
satisfaction when they reported not sacrificing the present for the future (vs. sacrificing). It is 
possible that we did not see strong differences in the life satisfaction outcome measure between 
the future focus condition and present focus condition for incremental theorists in Study 3 
because we asked them to describe only one instance of sacrificing the future for the present. For 
example, in Study 2, one incremental theorist in the present-focus condition wrote that they 
recently decided to hang out with a friend for the weekend (present goal) which they knew would 
conflict with their work schedule (future sacrifice). Although we cannot say for certain, we can 
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speculate that, in general, one instance of sacrificing the future for the present might not affect an 
incremental theorist’s overall life satisfaction if there are a number of other instances in their life 
where they are sacrificing the present for the future. Future manipulations that encourage 
participants to describe several decisions of the same ilk (and more likely to have a permanent 
impact on future goals) might elicit stronger differences in life satisfaction for incremental 
theorists. It is not possible to determine with the present data whether or not incremental theorists 
are naturally drawn to pursuing longer-term, future-oriented goals in reality. This will be 
important to discern in future research. However, should this be the general case, it is possible 
that incremental theorists might not see that a temporary focus on present goals is much of an 
obstacle to future goals. We suspect that incremental theorists who regularly sacrifice the future 
for present/immediate outcomes are likely to be less satisfied overall than those who regularly 
sacrifice the present for the future. Corroborating evidence can be found in Study 1 whereby 
incremental theorists are significantly less satisfied when they have a low (vs. high) future focus 
time perspective and low (vs. high) promotion orientation, suggesting that incremental theorists 
likely do find great satisfaction in striving for the future.  
 In Study 5, entity theorists showed no evidence of increased satisfaction when goals were 
framed as controllable (for those initially low in LS). However, the entity theorists in this group 
reported having the same amount of control as incremental theorists did over the specific future 
goal (i.e., the manipulation check). It is possible then, that for entity theorists in the low LS 
group, feeling control over their future goal did not necessarily make them feel satisfied about it. 
It is entirely possible (although speculation at this point) that the initially low LS entity theorists 
were disappointed at the thought of sacrificing a present (more certain) reward even when future 
goals were made to feel controllable. Perhaps present benefits (and the sacrifice of them) may 
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mean more (or have different meaning) to entity (vs. incremental) theorists, which may, in turn, 
deflate life satisfaction outcomes irrespective of how certain the future goal seems.  
Some corroborating evidence can be seen for this speculation in Study 1. For example, in 
Study 1, we found that entity theorists were significantly more satisfied than incremental 
theorists when they held a strong present hedonic time perspective (e.g., Zimbardo & Boyd, 
1999), however, this did not preclude them from enjoying future goals; entity theorists were just 
as satisfied with life as incremental theorists when they also had a strong future time perspective 
and also when they were high in promotion focus (e.g., Higgins, 1997). Thus, it is possible that 
entity theorists can feel satisfied when working toward future goals. However, when present 
goals and future goals are pitted against each other, sacrificing a present goal might take all the 
pleasure out of the prospect of future goal fulfillment for entity theorists. For example, a 
graduate student may sacrifice their relationship with their young child in the short term while 
completing a thesis of great importance. Even though the student might see the thesis completion 
as completely within their control and important for their future, the sacrifice endured along the 
way might make the journey substantially less enjoyable than a journey that did not entail such 
present sacrifices. Thus, even a confident belief in the certainty of a future goal might not 
eliminate the possible perceived (and real) loss involved in sacrificing too much in the present.  
Popular wisdom often highlights the importance of not losing sight of the joys of today 
by focusing solely on the journey on tomorrow, (e.g., “I’ll be happy when . . .”). However, as we 
speculate above, it is possible that sacrificing present benefits (for future goals) may have 
different meaning for entity (vs. incremental) theorists. Future research could examine this 
question. It is possible that, for entity theorists, the loss of a short-term benefit cannot be 
outweighed by the benefits of long term goals.  
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Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
Previous research on implicit theories has found that individual differences in beliefs 
about change versus stability play an important role in how people approach and interpret the 
world (Hong et al., 1999; Plaks et al., 2009). Although implicit theories have been studied 
extensively as a cognitive construct for their effects on motivation (Dweck, 1999), learning 
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and person perception (Plaks et al., 2009), relatively little is known in 
the “self” domain and about the connection between implicit theories and life satisfaction. The 
present set of studies sheds some light as to one possible means by which these different theory 
holders might achieve life satisfaction. 
Previous research on implicit theories has also found that incremental theorists feel more 
internal control (Dweck, 1995a) whereas entity theorists feel less internal control and are less 
optimistic about goal outcomes (Burnette et al, 2013). Our findings suggest that this might be 
one reason why entity theorists are less likely to feel satisfied by pursuing future goals over more 
certain present goals (and vice versa for incremental theorists). Looking specifically at future 
goals, we were able to determine that, indeed, incremental theorists felt more certainty and 
control over future outcomes, and finally, that feelings of future control also led to higher life 
satisfaction and also a greater willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. 
Previous researchers have suggested that the entity system tends to breed uncertainty 
(Dweck et al., 1995b) leading to fewer and less successful self-regulation strategies (Burnette et 
al., 2013). Our research supports these past findings – it is possible that entity theorists gravitate 
toward short term goals because they provide more satisfaction. One outcome might be that 
entity theorists then develop fewer long term self-regulation strategies. 
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Self-regulation is often defined as a future-oriented endeavor (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2007); whereby people delay immediate rewards in preference for larger future rewards. Thus, 
one’s willingness to sacrifice the present for the future can be construed as a self-regulation 
strategy. The present research suggests that incremental theorists are not only more willing to 
sacrifice the present for the future (i.e., self-regulate), but that they also feel greater satisfaction 
with life when doing so. Some research has found that people can feel quite fulfilled when 
contemplating ‘anticipated joys’ of the future. People often pre-experience the expected hedonic 
outcomes of future events and can underestimate potential future misfortune (or pain) in the 
process (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Although speculative, it is possible that incremental theorists 
do not construe present-sacrifices as terribly painful or negative. Indeed, it seems entirely 
possible that incremental theorists relish their self-regulatory prowess and feel a degree of pride 
in working toward hard earned outcomes. To our knowledge, though, how entity and incremental 
theorists mentally represent present sacrifices (e.g., the degree of positive or negative valence) 
and or construe the process toward future goal fulfillment is not as yet known. These questions 
are ripe for investigation in future research.  
 As we hypothesized at the onset of this program of research, entity theorists are likely to 
be more satisfied when pursuing present (over future) goals and incremental theorists are likely 
to be more satisfied when pursuing future (over present) goals. This, of course, does not imply 
that people only pursue the goals that provide them with the highest positive evaluations of life 
all the time. Everyone pursues both present and future goals (Harber et al., 2003) and when these 
goals conflict, they may need to sacrifice one over the other for any number of reasons 
(Emmons, 1986). An important question that is not addressed in the present research is whether 
or not entity theorists tend to pursue present (over future) goals – in day to day living - and 
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whether or not incremental theorists tend to pursue future (over present) goals. It is possible that 
entity and incremental theorists (who differ on their achievement goals; e.g., performance vs. 
mastery) have different life experiences for which types of goals they are used to seeing work out 
in their lives when tension exists between present and future desires. For example, if an entity 
theorists has successfully achieved performance goals in the past (which may be more present-
oriented than future-oriented), then they might see present-oriented goals as more meaningful in 
their lives, place greater values on such goals and possibly pursue these types of goals more 
naturally. In contrast, if incremental theorists have successfully achieved mastery-oriented goals 
in the past (e.g., if you don’t succeed, try try again) these may be more future-oriented than 
present-oriented in nature.  As a result they might see future-oriented goals as more meaningful 
in their lives, place greater value on such goals and pursue these types of goals more naturally. 
As noted previously, entity and incremental theorists might find different meaning in present vs. 
future goals which might ultimately affect the criterion for which these theory holders use to 
determine what “a good life” is – and what makes life satisfying. 
Some of this theorizing parallels work by Sheldon and Elliot (1999) who find that when 
people select goals that match their underlying values and interests (i.e., self-concordant goals) 
they are more likely to feel more satisfied with their life. Sheldon and Elliott found that self-
concordant goals tend to feel more authentic and meaningful and are more likely to be achieved 
thus furthering the well-being effect. In the case of implicit theories, there is a great deal of 
evidence showing that incremental theorists typically pursue learning and mastery-oriented goals 
(even though these goals require extra effort) which enables them to develop self-efficacy and 
strengthens their self-regulation abilities (Burnette et al., 2013). Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that pursuing future goals at the expense of present ones might be a good “fit” for an incremental 
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theorist and deeply satisfying. In contrast, evidence shows that entity theorists tend to pursue 
performance goals that show off their enduring qualities and allow them to validate themselves 
(Dweck, 1999) however, to maintain this stature, entity theorists need to repeatedly seek 
reflections of their abilities in their performance. Thus, it is reasonable to surmise that pursuing 
immediate goals at the expense of future goals might be a good “fit” for an entity theorist. 
Although researchers have begun to examine the role of individual differences and personal 
goals and their effect on happiness and life satisfaction for individuals (see Myers & Diener, 
1995 for a review), relatively little emphasis has been placed on considering how people with 
different underlying beliefs might fare better in different contexts. 
 So, what is the best way to achieve life satisfaction? Is it better to live for today or focus 
on the future? The findings of the present research might suggest that there may be two routes to 
life satisfaction depending on whether or not one holds entity or incremental beliefs. However, it 
is important to note that there are pitfalls with both types of goal pursuits (present and future). As 
noted earlier in this thesis, focusing on future goals is not only culturally valued (Spears et al., 
2001) but has many concrete positive consequences for individuals in Western society such as 
higher socioeconomic status and superior academic achievement (Teahan, 1958; Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999); both of which are related to higher life satisfaction. Furthermore, people can enjoy 
engaging in the process of striving toward a future goal (Diener, 1984; Schmuck & Sheldon, 
2001). However, if someone is always focused on the future, they may sacrifice really beneficial 
goals along the way, such as building relationships with family and friends.  
Focusing on the present has many positive consequences as well. People who engage in 
hedonic activities often experience positive emotions (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Sobol-Kwapinska, 
2013) which can often lead to feelings of higher life satisfaction in general (Lyubomirsky & 
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Layous, 2013). Furthermore, people with a present focus tend to nurture and enjoy their personal 
relationships (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). However, with a focus on the present, people may end 
up sacrificing important long-term objectives such as their career and may engage in risky 
behaviours that lead to negative outcomes (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). 
Perhaps there is a middle ground – a way to strive toward future goals while not 
sacrificing the present – where future goals are always on the radar and in sight, but present goals 
are also valued. Some might say this type of balanced goal pursuit is a way of “enjoying the 
journey.” A quote that sums up this thought nicely is one found in a recent blog-post. The author 
states, “you need to have fun if you hope to reach the top of the mountain,” (Linge, 2011).  
 This concept is somewhat related to what Csikszentmihalyi (1990) might call “flow;” 
being immensely engaged in a present-moment activity, where this activity might also benefit 
some longer-term future goal. For example, a painter who is deeply engaged in perfecting the 
smallest details of a painting knowing that the entire collection of works are to be shown at some 
point in the future. It is possible that optimal experience – or optimal life satisfaction is possible 
when present and future goals are not considered an ‘either/or’, but rather parts of each other 
along the journey. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are a few limitations within present studies that should be pointed out. First, we 
discovered late in the process that Study 2 had a failure of random assignment. Without the 
corroborating evidence of Study 2, it is important to qualify the strength of the conclusions 
considerably until further research is conducted. Although correlational in nature, Study 1 does 
show that these relationships exist naturally. Broadly speaking though, replication research will 
be an important next step in the research process. 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 106 
 
 In some of the studies our sample sizes were somewhat low. For example, in Study 3, we 
did not initially plan for a 3-way interaction to examine those low and high in initial life 
satisfaction. With two hundred and thirty-nice participants in the study, the final analysis had 
approximately 30 participants in each of the eight cells. Similar to what is noted above, future 
studies that replicate the results with higher power is an important goal for future studies. 
 It is also important to note that in the present set of studies we did not test the causal role 
of implicit theories. It is possible that temporary shifts in implicit theories (i.e., via manipulation) 
might affect one’s feelings of control over the future, one’s willingness to sacrifice the present 
for the future or possibly even one’s evaluation of life satisfaction. Furthermore, it is hard to rule 
out potential third variables or individual differences that may vary naturally with implicit 
theories when implicit theories are simply measured. Thus, we expect to manipulate implicit 
theories in future research studies in order to determine the causal role of these belief systems. 
 Finally, we do not address what goals entity and incremental theorists tend to pursue. It is 
quite plausible that the affective reactions (i.e., the life satisfaction evaluations) we document 
would be linked to a tendency to pursue goals that produce greater satisfaction (e.g., 
entity/present and increment/future). However, it is also possible that people may sometimes 
pursue goals that leave them feeling dissatisfied, at least in the moment. Future research can 
extend the focus on life satisfaction responses to a focus on goal decisions and typical patterns of 
goal pursuit among entity and incremental theorists, as well as the degree to which these 
evaluative responses might contribute to ultimate goal success.  
Conclusions 
 We found that incremental theorists, who believe that attributes are malleable and can 
change and develop over time, feel more satisfied with life when prioritizing future goals over 
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present ones and entity theorists, who believe that attributes are relatively stable over time, feel 
more satisfied prioritizing immediate goals over future ones. The present set of studies suggests 
that implicit theories of change and stability importantly moderate the effects of temporal focus 
on life satisfaction.  
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Appendix A: Study 1 Questionnaire 
Appendix B: Study 2 Questionnaire 
Appendix C: Study 3 Questionnaire 
Appendix D: Study 4 Questionnaire 
Appendix E: Study 5 Questionnaire 
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Appendix A: Study 1 Questionnaire 
Demographics 
Age  _________ 
 
Gender 
 Female  
 Male  
 Other  
 Do not wish to answer  
 
Income 
 
Average 'annual' household Income 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 - 30,000 
 30,000 - 40,000 
 40,000 – 50,000 
 50,000 - 60,000 
 60,000 - 70,000 
 70,000 - 80,000 
 80,000 - 100,000 
 100,000 – 120,000 
 120,000 – 140,000 
 More than 140,000 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item measure of Life 
Satisfaction 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
dissatisfied          
Extremely 
satisfied 
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Implicit Theories: 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below. 
People can’t change the kind of person they are; No matter what they do, their fundamental 
attributes stay the same. (R)  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
A person’s basic characteristics and traits can’t be changed very much, no matter how hard they 
try. (R)  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future 
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)  
 
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more 
rewards in the future. 
 
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things 
that life has to offer. (R)   
 
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)   
 
 
Regulatory Focus 
This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually occur or have 
occurred in your life. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never or 
seldom 
   Very often 
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1. Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life? (R)   
 
2. Growing up, would you ever “cross the line”? (R)   
 
3. How often have you accomplished things that got you psyched to work even harder? 
 
4. Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up? (R)   
 
5. How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents? 
 
6. Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable? (R)   
 
7. Do you often do well at different things that you try? 
 
8. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times. (R)   
 
9. When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform as 
well as I ideally would like to do. (R)   
 
10. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life. 
 
11. I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate 
me to put effort into them. (R)   
 
Promotion Orientation, Items: 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11 
Prevention Orientation, Items: 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 
 
 
Time Perspective 
 
Below are a number of statements.  Read each one and rate: “HOW characteristic the statement 
is of you” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very 
uncharacteristic 
of me 
   
Very 
characteristic 
of me 
 
1. I believe that getting together with one's friends to party is one of life's important pleasures. 
2. Familiar childhood sights, sounds, smells often bring back a flood of wonderful memories. 
3. Fate determines much in my life. 
4. I often think of what I should have done differently in my life. 
5. My decisions are mostly influenced by people and things around me. 
6. I believe that a person's day should be planned ahead each morning. 
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7. It gives me pleasure to think about my past. 
8. I do things impulsively. 
9. If things don't get done on time, I don't worry about it. (R)   
10. When I want to achieve something, I set goals and consider specific means for reaching those 
goals. 
11. On balance, there is much more good to recall than bad in my past. 
12. When listening to my favorite music, I often lose all track of time. 
13. Meeting tomorrow's deadlines and doing other necessary work comes before tonight's play. 
14. Since whatever will be will be, it doesn't really matter what I do. 
15.1 enjoy stories about how things used to be in the "good old times." 
16. Painful past experiences keep being replayed in my mind. 
17. I try to live my life as fully as possible, one day at a time. 
18. It upsets me to be late for appointments. 
19. Ideally, I would live each day as if it were my last. 
20. Happy memories of good times spring readily to mind. 
21. I meet my obligations to friends and authorities on time. 
22. I've taken my share of abuse and rejection in the past. 
23. I make decisions on the spur of the moment. 
24. I take each day as it is rather than try to plan it out. (R)   
25. The past has too many unpleasant memories that I prefer not to think about. (R)   
26. It is important to put excitement in my life. 
27. I've made mistakes in the past that I wish I could undo. 
28. I feel that it's more important to enjoy what you're doing than to get work done on time. 
29. I get nostalgic about my childhood. 
30. Before making a decision, I weigh the costs against the benefits. 
31. Taking risks keeps my life from becoming boring. 
32. It is more important for me to enjoy life's journey than to focus only on the destination. 
33. Things rarely work out as I expected. 
34. It's hard for me to forget unpleasant images of my youth. 
35. It takes joy out of the process and flow of my activities, if I have to think about goals, 
outcomes, and products. 
36. Even when I am enjoying the present, I am drawn back to comparisons with similar past 
experiences. 
37. You can't really plan for the future because things change so much. 
38. My life path is controlled by forces I cannot influence. 
39. It doesn't make sense to worry about the future, since there is nothing that I can do about it 
anyway. 
40. I complete projects on time by making steady progress. 
41. I find myself tuning out when family members talk about the way things used to be. (R)   
42. I take risks to put excitement in my life. 
43. I make lists of things to do. 
44. I often follow my heart more than my head. 
45. I am able to resist temptations when I know that there is work to be done. 
46. I find myself getting swept up in the excitement of the moment. 
47. Life today is too complicated; I would prefer the simpler life of the past. 
48. I prefer friends who are spontaneous rather than predictable. 
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49. I like family rituals and traditions that are regularly repeated. 
50. I think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past. 
51.1 keep working at difficult, uninteresting tasks if they will help me get ahead. 
52. Spending what I earn on pleasures today is better than saving for tomorrow's security. 
53. Often luck pays off better than hard work. 
54. I think about the good things that I have missed out on in my life. 
55. I like my close relationships to be passionate. 
56. There will always be time to catch up on my work. (R)   
 
Past Negative:  4, 5, 16, 22, 27, 33, 34, 36, 50, 54 
Present Hedonistic: 1, 8, 12, 17, 19, 23, 26, 28, 31, 32, 42, 44, 46, 48, 55 
Future: 6, 9R, 10, 13, 18, 21, 24R, 30, 40, 43, 45, 51, 56R  
Past Positive:2, 7, 11, 15, 20, 25R, 29, 41R, 49 
Present Fatalistic: 3, 14, 35, 37, 38, 39, 47, 52, 53 
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Appendix B: Study 2 Questionnaire 
Demographics 
Age  _________ 
 
Gender 
 Female  
 Male  
 Other  
 Do not wish to answer  
 
Income 
 
Average 'annual' household Income 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 - 30,000 
 30,000 - 40,000 
 40,000 – 50,000 
 50,000 - 60,000 
 60,000 - 70,000 
 70,000 - 80,000 
 80,000 - 100,000 
 100,000 – 120,000 
 120,000 – 140,000 
 More than 140,000 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of 
Life Satisfaction 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
dissatisfied          
Extremely 
satisfied 
 
Mood: pre-measure 
Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
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Implicit Theories 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they 
apply to yourself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree     
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R) 
 
2. I can always change my personality. 
 
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very 
much. (R) 
 
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed. 
(R) 
 
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am. 
 
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change 
my deepest attributes. (R) 
 
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am. 
 
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change 
that. (R) 
 
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much. 
 
10. I can change even my most basic qualities. 
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Approach/Avoidance 
 
Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the following statements. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. By nature, I am a very nervous person. 
 
2. Thinking about the things I want really energizes me. 
 
3. It doesn’t take much to make me worry. 
 
4. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I immediately get excited. 
 
5. It doesn’t take a lot to get me excited and motivated. 
 
6. I feel anxiety and fear very deeply. 
 
7. I react very strongly to bad experiences. 
 
8. I’m always on the lookout for positive opportunities and experiences. 
 
9. When it looks like something bad could happen, I have a strong urge to escape. 
 
10. When good things happen to me, it affects me very strongly. 
 
11. When I want something, I feel a strong desire to go after it. 
 
12. It is easy for me to imagine bad things that might happen to me. 
 
Approach – items: 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11 
Avoidance – items: 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12 
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Manipulation and Goal Elicitation   (Present versus Future focus) 
(participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions) 
 
 
Present Focus (i.e., sacrifice future for present) 
 
Read the following carefully. 
 
Sometimes in life, there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what we 
hope to achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice or set 
aside a future goal in order to satisfy an immediate (or present) goal or desire - for example, 
we may choose to enjoy a night out with friends now even though it may hinder our work on a 
project that might benefit our future career. Or, perhaps the benefits of an enjoyable vacation 
now may be prioritized over our desire to save money for the future.       
 
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - or worked on recently - where you are 
sacrificing some future benefit in order to prioritize a present benefit.    Briefly describe 
WHAT that decision was.  (We will ask more about this decision later - for now, please just 
describe WHAT that decision was). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future Focus (i.e., sacrifice present for future) 
 
Read the following carefully. 
 
Sometimes in life, there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what we 
hope to achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice or set 
aside an immediate (or present) goal or desire in order to work toward a long-term goal - 
for example, we  may choose to sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work 
on a project that might benefit our future career. Or, perhaps our desire to save money for the 
future may be prioritized over the benefits of an enjoyable vacation now. 
 
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - or worked on recently - where you are 
sacrificing some present benefit in order to prioritize a future benefit.    Briefly describe 
WHAT that decision was.  (We will ask more about this decision later - for now, please just 
describe WHAT that decision was). 
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now 
 
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now.  Note the scale before 
providing your answers. 
 
 
Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
I am not a very happy person. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
All things considered, I am quite happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
I feel very happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
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DV:  Life Satisfaction 
 
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
 
3. I am satisfied with my life 
 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
 
Goal Importance 
 
Earlier in the survey you wrote about a recent decision you have been making (or made) to 
prioritize a (present/future) benefit over a (future/present) benefit. 
 
Present focus condition 
How unimportant or important was the present goal at the time? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
Very 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
unimportant 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
 
How unimportant or important was the future goal at the time? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
Very 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
unimportant 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
 
Future focus condition 
How unimportant or important was the future goal at the time? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
Very 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
unimportant 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
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How unimportant or important was the present goal at the time? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
Very 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
unimportant 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
 
 
Consideration of Future Consequences 
 
For each statement below, indicate whether the statement is like you or not like you. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
like me 
Not like 
me 
Not much 
like me 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
like me 
Like me 
Just like 
me 
 
 
1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my 
day to day behavior. 
 
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result 
for many years. 
 
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself. 
 
4. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or weeks) 
outcomes of my actions. 
 
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take. 
 
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future 
outcomes. 
 
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the 
negative outcome will not occur for many years. 
 
8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences 
than a behavior with less-important immediate consequences. 
 
 
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems 
will be resolved before they reach crisis level. 
 
10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt 
with at a later time. 
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11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems 
that may occur at a later date. 
 
12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than 
behavior that has distant outcomes. 
 
 
 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future 
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)  
 
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more 
rewards in the future. 
 
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things 
that life has to offer. (R)   
 
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)   
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Appendix C: Study 3 Questionnaire 
Demographics 
Age  _________ 
 
Gender 
 Female  
 Male  
 Other  
 Do not wish to answer  
 
Income 
 
Average 'annual' household Income 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 - 30,000 
 30,000 - 40,000 
 40,000 – 50,000 
 50,000 - 60,000 
 60,000 - 70,000 
 70,000 - 80,000 
 80,000 - 100,000 
 100,000 – 120,000 
 120,000 – 140,000 
 More than 140,000 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of 
Life Satisfaction 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
dissatisfied          
Extremely 
satisfied 
 
Mood: pre-measure 
Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
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Implicit Theories 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they 
apply to yourself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree     
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R) 
 
2. I can always change my personality. 
 
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very 
much. (R) 
 
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed. 
(R) 
 
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am. 
 
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change 
my deepest attributes. (R) 
 
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am. 
 
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change 
that. (R) 
 
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much. 
 
10. I can change even my most basic qualities. 
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Goal Elicitation 
 
Preamble 
 
For the next sections we will ask you to generate two distinct kinds of financial goals that matter 
to you these days.  One goal should be a present goal - a goal to spend money now for an 
immediate outcome. Another goal should be a future goal - a goal to save money in favor of a 
longer-term future outcome (i.e., save now to spend later).   
 
 
Goal Elicitation 
 
Present Goal - spend money now for an immediate outcome 
 
We all make many financial decisions in life about how and when to spend or save our money. 
Sometimes we choose to spend money on things that will bring us enjoyment now and in 
the short-term future.  Think about a decision you could make now, or very soon in the 
future to spend money on something that you will enjoy immediately (without regard to any 
longer-term future desires). Briefly describe this short-term spending decision you could make. 
(Note: do not describe it in detail - just indicate what the specific short-term spending decision 
would be). 
 
 
 
 
Present goal importance 
 
Regarding the spending decision you just listed: 
How personally important is it to you to act on the decision to spend now for the short-term? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important      
Extremely 
important 
 
 
Present goal achievement certainty 
 
How certain are you that if you acted on this short-term goal, you would ultimately achieve the 
desired outcome?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not certain 
at all       
Extremely 
certain 
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Future goal - save money in favor of a longer-term future outcome 
 
We all make many financial decisions in life about how and when to spend or save our money. 
Sometimes we choose to save money now in order to achieve some longer-term goal or 
make a more distant future purchase. Think about a decision you could make now, or very 
soon in the future to save  money now in order to work toward a future purchase or other goal 
you will enjoy at a future time (without regard to any present or short-term desires).  Briefly 
describe this long-term future saving decision you could make. (Note: do not describe it in 
detail - just indicate what the specific long-term saving decision would be). 
 
 
 
 
 
Future goal importance 
 
Regarding the saving decision you just listed: 
How personally important is it to you to act on the decision to save now for a long-term future 
goal? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important      
Extremely 
important 
 
 
 
Present goal achievement certainty  
 
How certain are you that if you acted on this long-term future goal, you would ultimately 
achieve the desired outcome?   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not certain 
at all       
Extremely 
certain 
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Manipulation – (Present versus Future focus) 
(participants were randomly assigned to one condition) 
 
Present focus 
 
There is often a direct tension between our desires now (in the present) and what we hope to 
achieve in the future.  Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, a 
future goal in order to satisfy an immediate (or present) goal or desire. Think about your 
financial goals in this context, and the tension that exists between spending money on things we 
want to have or do now and on things we hope to have or do in the long-term future. 
 
On the previous pages, you listed a current desire (spend now) and a future desire (save for the 
future).   Imagine that only one of these goals can be fulfilled - in this case, focus on fulfilling 
only the current desire (spend now) - at the expense of the longer-term desire.      
Explain what will happen when you sacrifice the long-term future desire (save for later) and act 
on the current desire (spend now). Please imagine carrying out this decision and describe your 
thoughts and reactions in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future focus 
 
There is often a direct tension between our desires now (in the present) and what we hope to 
achieve in the future.Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, an 
immediate (or present) goal in order to work toward a long-term goal or desire. Think about 
your financial goals in this context, and the tension that exists between spending money on 
things we want to have or do now and on things we hope to have or do in the long-term future. 
 
On the previous pages, you listed a current desire (spend now) and a future desire (save for the 
future). Imagine that only one of these goals can be fulfilled - in this case, focus on 
fulfilling only the future desire (save for the future) - at the expense of the short-term desire.  
Explain what will happen when you sacrifice the short-term desire (spend now) and act on the 
long-term future desire (save for later). Please imagine carrying out this decision and describe 
your thoughts and reactions in detail. 
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now 
 
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now.  Note the scale before 
providing your answers. 
 
 
Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
I am not a very happy person. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
All things considered, I am quite happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
I feel very happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
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DV:  Life Satisfaction 
 
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
 
3. I am satisfied with my life 
 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
 
 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future 
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)  
 
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more 
rewards in the future. 
 
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things 
that life has to offer. (R)   
 
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)   
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Appendix D: Study 4 Questionnaire 
Demographics 
Age  _________ 
 
Gender 
 Female  
 Male  
 Other  
 Do not wish to answer  
 
Income 
 
Average 'annual' household Income 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 - 30,000 
 30,000 - 40,000 
 40,000 – 50,000 
 50,000 - 60,000 
 60,000 - 70,000 
 70,000 - 80,000 
 80,000 - 100,000 
 100,000 – 120,000 
 120,000 – 140,000 
 More than 140,000 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of 
Life Satisfaction 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
dissatisfied          
Extremely 
satisfied 
 
Mood: pre-measure 
Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
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Implicit Theories 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they 
apply to yourself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree     
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R) 
 
2. I can always change my personality. 
 
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very 
much. (R) 
 
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed. 
(R) 
 
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am. 
 
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change 
my deepest attributes. (R) 
 
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am. 
 
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change 
that. (R) 
 
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much. 
 
10. I can change even my most basic qualities. 
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Manipulation Preamble – All participants 
 
Sometimes in life there is a direct tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what 
we hope to achieve in the future.  
 
Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, an immediate (or present) 
goal or desire in order to work toward a long-term goal - for example, we  may choose to 
sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work on a project that might benefit 
our future career. Or, perhaps our desire to save money for the future may be prioritized over the 
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.  
 
Manipulation (Goal Elicitation) – 3 Conditions, randomly assigned: Control over the 
Future, No Control over the Future, Baseline 
 
Control over the Future 
 
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some present 
benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.  
This future goal should be one that you are (1) still working on, (2) have decided to pursue 
despite the sacrifices that you must make in the present, and (3) achieving the future goal feels 
within your "control" and you are "certain" it will work out. 
 
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is.  (We will ask you more about this decision later - for 
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is). 
 
No Control over the Future 
 
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some present 
benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.  
This future goal should be one that you are (1) still working on, (2) have decided to pursue 
despite the sacrifices that you must make in the present, and (3) achieving the future goal 
feels outside of your "personal control" and you are "uncertain" if it will work out. 
 
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is.  (We will ask you more about this decision later - for 
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is). 
 
Baseline 
 
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some present 
benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.  
This future goal should be one that you are (1) still working on, and (2) have decided to pursue 
despite the sacrifices that you must make in the present. 
 
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is.  (We will ask you more about this decision later - for 
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is). 
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now 
 
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now.  Note the scale before 
providing your answers. 
 
 
Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
I am not a very happy person. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
All things considered, I am quite happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
I feel very happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
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DV:  Life Satisfaction 
 
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
 
3. I am satisfied with my life 
 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
 
Goal Importance 
 
On a previous page, you indicated a decision where you are sacrificing some present 
benefit/goal in order to achieve some future benefit/goal. 
 
Please indicate how important the present benefit/goal is to you in general. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important      
Extremely 
important 
 
Please indicate how important the future benefit/goal is to you in general. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important      
Extremely 
important 
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Specific goal certainty/controllability 
 
From "very uncertain" to "very certain" -  How "certain" are you that you will be able to attain 
this future benefit/goal? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
uncertain 
that I will 
attain future 
goal/benefit      
Very certain 
that I will 
attain future 
goal/benefit 
 
To what degree does achieving the future benefit/goal feel "within your control"?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
within my 
control      
Very much 
within my 
control 
 
 
General goal certainty/attainability 
 
Please rate your level of disagreement or agreement with the following statements. 
 
Attaining future goals are almost always certain to work out. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Since whatever will be will be, I am uncertain about future goals working out.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Future goals are certainly attainable - as long as enough sacrifices are made. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future 
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)  
 
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more 
rewards in the future. 
 
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things 
that life has to offer. (R)   
 
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)   
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Appendix E: Study 5 Questionnaire 
Demographics 
Age  _________ 
 
Gender 
 Female  
 Male  
 Other  
 Do not wish to answer  
 
Income 
 
Average 'annual' household Income 
 Less than 20,000 
 20,000 - 30,000 
 30,000 - 40,000 
 40,000 – 50,000 
 50,000 - 60,000 
 60,000 - 70,000 
 70,000 - 80,000 
 80,000 - 100,000 
 100,000 – 120,000 
 120,000 – 140,000 
 More than 140,000 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of 
Life Satisfaction 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extremely 
dissatisfied          
Extremely 
satisfied 
 
Mood: pre-measure 
Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 137 
 
Implicit Theories 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they 
apply to yourself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree     
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R) 
 
2. I can always change my personality. 
 
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very 
much. (R) 
 
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed. 
(R) 
 
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am. 
 
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change 
my deepest attributes. (R) 
 
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am. 
 
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change 
that. (R) 
 
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much. 
 
10. I can change even my most basic qualities. 
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Goal Elicitation – All Participants 
 
Sometimes in life there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what we 
hope to achieve in the future. 
 
Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, an immediate (or present) 
goal or desire in order to work toward a long-term goal - for example, we  may choose to 
sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work on a project that might benefit 
our future career. Or, perhaps our desire to save money for the future may be prioritized over the 
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.  
 
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some 
present benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.  
 
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is.  (We will ask you more about this decision later - for 
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is). 
 
 
Manipulation – Non-Controllable, Controllable, and Baseline 
 
 
Non-Controllable Future Condition 
 
Think of the future benefit/goal that you just identified. You may work toward this goal, BUT, 
the future is less controllable than we sometimes realize, so, we can never be certain that the 
goals we are aiming for will work out, despite the sacrifices we make in the present. 
  
Think about how the future benefit/goal you identified is uncertain to work out and write down 
the ways that you don't have control over how it might work out. 
 
 
Controllable Future Condition 
 
Think of the future benefit/goal that you just identified. As you work toward this goal, recall that 
the future is actually more controllable than we sometimes realize, so, we can often be pretty 
certain that the goals we are aiming for will work out, given the sacrifices we make in the 
present.  
  
Think about how the future benefit/goal you identified is relatively certain to work out and write 
down the ways that you foresee having control over how it will work out. 
 
 
Baseline Condition 
 
No task is asked of participants. 
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now 
 
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now.  Note the scale before 
providing your answers. 
 
 
Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
I am not a very happy person. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
All things considered, I am quite happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
 
I feel very happy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
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DV:  Life Satisfaction 
 
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
 
3. I am satisfied with my life 
 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
 
Goal Importance 
 
On a previous page, you indicated a decision where you are sacrificing some present 
benefit/goal in order to achieve some future benefit/goal. 
 
Please indicate how important the present benefit/goal is to you in general. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important      
Extremely 
important 
 
Please indicate how important the future benefit/goal is to you in general. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important      
Extremely 
important 
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Goal Progress 
 
From 'just beginning' to 'almost completed' - Approximately how far along are you in trying to 
attain this future benefit/goal?  If you have not started pursuing this goal yet, indicate "have not 
started yet." 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Have not 
started yet 
Just 
beginning      
Almost 
completed 
 
 
 
Specific goal certainty/controllability 
 
From "very uncertain" to "very certain" -  How "certain" are you that you will be able to attain 
this future benefit/goal? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
uncertain 
that I will 
attain future 
goal/benefit      
Very certain 
that I will 
attain future 
goal/benefit 
 
To what degree does achieving the future benefit/goal feel "within your control"?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
within my 
control      
Very much 
within my 
control 
 
 
General goal certainty/attainability 
 
Please rate your level of disagreement or agreement with the following statements. 
 
Attaining future goals are almost always certain to work out. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Since whatever will be will be, I am uncertain about future goals working out.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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Future goals are certainly attainable - as long as enough sacrifices are made. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Pessimism 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. There is no guarantee that working hard will get you the future rewards you hope for. 
2. I feel like society doesn't have very much to offer me. 
3. I don't think I'm ever going to make a lot of money. 
4. I know that if I work hard now I will benefit from it in the future. (R) 
 
 
Optimism 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
2. If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R) 
3. I'm always optimistic about my future. 
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Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future 
 
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree      
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)  
 
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more 
rewards in the future. 
 
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things 
that life has to offer. (R)   
 
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)   
 
 
 
Sacrifice the Present: One vs. Many Instances 
 
For today's exercise . . . when you thought about giving up a present goal/benefit - would you say 
this is a "one time" sacrifice? OR, is it about giving up "several" immediate rewards? -- i.e., 
making many immediate sacrifices over time on the way to the future goal/benefit.  
 
On the scale below . . To what degree did "sacrificing" the present represent a 'one time' sacrifice 
versus 'many sacrifices' over time? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
One time 
sacrifice      
Many 
sacrifices 
over time 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
 
Study 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures  
 
 Means (SD) 
Life Satisfaction 7.12 (2.31) 
Implicit Theories of Personalityi 4.59 (1.54) 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future 4.61 (1.27) 
Promotion Orientation 3.57 (0.66) 
Prevention Orientation 3.36 (1.06) 
Time Perspective  
Past Negative 3.01 (0.75) 
Past Positive 3.39 (0.82) 
Future 3.59 (0.63) 
Present Hedonic 3.04 (0.71) 
Present Fatalistic  2.45 (0.68) 
 
Note. i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 2 
 
Study 1: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent variables (overall) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Life Satisfaction -          
2. Implicit Theoriesi -.03 -         
3. Willingness to Sacrifice -.01  .22** -        
4. Promotion Orientation .54**  .18** .10 -       
5. Prevention Orientation .07 -.16* .12† .05 -      
6. Past Negative -.49** -.09 -.12†  -.50**  -.22** -     
7. Past Positive .39** -.01 .03  .28** .16*   -.28** -    
8. Future .22** .11 .44**  .30**  .30** -.12† .16* -   
9. Present Hedonic .21* .01 -.36**  .18**  -.45** .07  .21** -.35** -  
10. Present Fatalistic -.19*  -.32** -.45**  -.31** -.08  .33** .04 -.39** .30** - 
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p = .07. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
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Table 3 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Willingness to Sacrifice the 
Present for the Future   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.029 -.406 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.007 -0.10 
Step 2   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.012 -.164 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.024 -.332 
Implicit Theory X Willingness to Sacrifice .201  2.876* 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 * p = .004 
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Table 4 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Promotion Orientation and Willingness to Sacrifice the Present 
for the Future   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Promotion Orientation .548   9.186** 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.069 -1.161 
Step 2   
Promotion Orientation .548   9.107** 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.069 -1.156 
Promotion Orientation X Willingness to Sacrifice .007  .112 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
 * p < .001 
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Table 5 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Prevention Orientation and Willingness to Sacrifice the 
Present for the Future   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Prevention Orientation .074 1.036 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.023 -.318 
Step 2   
Prevention Orientation .075  1.052 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.009 -.124 
Prevention Orientation X Willingness to Sacrifice .083  1.157 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
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Table 6 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Promotion Orientation   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.134 -2.245* 
Promotion Orientation .565   9.454** 
Step 2   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.138 -2.316* 
Promotion Orientation .570   9.590** 
Implicit Theory X Promotion Orientation .108  1.843† 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .001, * p < .05, †p = .067  
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Table 7 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Prevention Orientation   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.020 -.286 
Prevention Orientation .068 .948 
Step 2   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.016 -.222 
Prevention Orientation .064 .890 
Implicit Theory X Prevention Orientation .054  .760 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 * p = .004 
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Table 8 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Promotion Orientation   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.12 -1.91† 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.05 -.81 
Promotion Orientation .57 9.40** 
Prevention Orientation .03 .51 
Step 2   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.11 -1.81† 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.06 -1.07 
Promotion Orientation .57 9.84** 
Prevention Orientation .04 .59 
Implicit Theory X Willingness to Sacrifice .24 4.00** 
Promotion X Willingness to Sacrifice -.10 -1.50 
Implicit Theory X Promotion .10 1.52 
Step 3   
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.10 -1.68† 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future -.06 -.95 
Promotion Orientation .59 9.50** 
Prevention Orientation .04 .63 
Implicit Theory X Willingness to Sacrifice .24 4.03** 
Promotion X Willingness to Sacrifice -.11 -1.67† 
Implicit Theory X Promotion .08 1.26 
ImpTheory X WilltoSac X Promotion -.06 -.82 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10 
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Table 9 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Present Hedonic Time 
Perspective   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Future .12 1.95* 
Present Fatalistic -.02 -.24 
Past Negative -.39 -6.00** 
Past Positive .26 4.12** 
Step 2   
Future .23 3.52** 
Present Fatalistic -.10 -1.52 
Past Negative -.41 -6.63** 
Past Positive .17 2.83** 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.13 -2.18* 
Present Hedonic .32 5.02** 
Step 3   
Future .22 3.42** 
Present Fatalistic -.12 -1.73† 
Past Negative -.39 -6.34** 
Past Positive .17 2.85** 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.12 -2.12* 
Present Hedonic .31 5.03** 
Implicit Theory X Present Hedonic -.12 -2.21* 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10 
Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction 159 
 
Table 10 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Future Time Perspective   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Present Hedonic .23 3.76** 
Present Fatalistic -.14 -2.14* 
Past Negative -.39 -6.13** 
Past Positive .24 3.85** 
Step 2   
Present Hedonic .32 5.02** 
Present Fatalistic -.10 -1.52 
Past Negative -.41 -6.63** 
Past Positive .17 2.83** 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.13 -2.18* 
Future .23 3.52** 
Step 3   
Present Hedonic .32 5.02** 
Present Fatalistic -.10 -1.46 
Past Negative -.41 -6.62** 
Past Positive .17 2.68** 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.13 -2.21* 
Future  .22 3.43** 
Implicit Theory X Future .05 0.92ns 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 11 
 
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Present Fatalistic Time 
Perspective   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Present Hedonic .29 4.67** 
Future .24 3.99** 
Past Negative -.43 -7.35** 
Past Positive .17 2.75** 
Step 2   
Present Hedonic .32 5.02** 
Future .23 3.52** 
Past Negative -.41 -6.63** 
Past Positive .17 2.83** 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.13 -2.18* 
Present Fatalistic -.10 -1.52** 
Step 3   
Present Hedonic .29 4.76** 
Future .20 3.11** 
Past Negative -.38 -6.18** 
Past Positive .18 2.95** 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.12 -2.09* 
Present Fatalistic -.11 -1.69† 
Implicit Theory X Present Fatalistic -.18 3.17** 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10 
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Table 12 
 
Study 2: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent variables (overall) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.   Life Satisfaction - DV -          
2.   Mood (positive) - DV .80** -         
3.   Life Satisfaction pre-
measure 
.87** .78** -        
4.   Mood pre-measure (i.e., not 
happy right now) 
-.63** -.66** -.61** -       
5.   Implicit Theories i -.02 .09 -.04  -.02 -      
6.   Approach Orientation .27** .37** .25**  -.17* .15* -     
7.   Avoidance Orientation -.46** -.52** -.43** .40** .01 .02 -    
8.   Consid of Future Consequ. .19* .22** .17* -.16* .13†  .14*  -.28** -   
9.   Willingness to Sacrifice  .00 .04 .00 -.07 .12†  -.06 -.10   .64** -  
10. Importance of Present Goal .01 -.07 .02 .06 .08  .05  .05 .03  -.11 - 
11. Importance of Future Goal -.03 .03 -.04  -.02 .13†  .21** .05  .10 .18* -.01 
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p ≤ .10. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
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Table 13 
 
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Condition  
 
Measures 
Present Focus 
Condition 
Future Focus 
Condition 
Means (SD) Means (SD) 
Life Satisfaction (DV) 4.51a (1.65) 4.33a (1.63) 
Mood (positive) - DV 5.07a (1.64) 4.97a (1.56) 
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 7.71a (2.55) 7.40a (2.57) 
Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy right now) 3.04a (1.99) 3.17a (1.82) 
Implicit Theories of Personalityi 3.25a (1.20) 3.18a (1.14) 
Approach Orientation 5.33a (.91) 5.29a (.83) 
Avoidance Orientation 3.93a (1.61) 3.97a (1.48) 
Consideration of Future Consequences 4.89a (.96) 4.85a (.99) 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future 4.52a (1.08) 5.00b (1.14) 
Importance of Present Goal 5.94a (1.01) 5.05b (1.60) 
Importance of Future Goal 5.57a (1.38) 6.14b (.73) 
 
Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference (p ≤ .01). 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 14 
 
Study 2: Regressing Life Satisfaction (DV) onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus) and Implicit 
Theory of Personality   
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Condition (present vs. future) -.06 -.80 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.02 -0.33 
Step 2   
Condition (present vs. future) -.06 -.78 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.01 -.13 
Condition X Implicit Theory .14  1.91† 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 †p = .057 
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Table 15 
Study 2: Regressing Life Satisfaction (DV) onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus), Implicit 
Theory of Personality while controlling for initial life satisfaction. 
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 1.42 75.56** 
Step 2   
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 1.42 23.87** 
Condition (present vs. future) -.03 -.41 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .02 .41 
Step 3   
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 1.42 23.53** 
Condition (present vs. future) -.02 -.41 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .02 .46 
Condition X Implicit Theory .03 .55 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01 
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Table 16 
Study 2: Regressing Initial Life Satisfaction (i.e., LS pre-measure) onto Condition (present focus vs. 
future focus) and Implicit Theory of Personality. 
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Condition (present vs. future) -.15 -.82 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.09 -0.54 
Step 2   
Condition (present vs. future) -.15 -.79 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.06 -.36 
Condition X Implicit Theory .30  1.83† 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 †p =.068 
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Table 17 
 
Study 3: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent variables (overall) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.   Life Satisfaction - DV -          
2.   Mood (positive) - DV .68** -         
3.   Life Satisfaction pre-measure  .81** .63** -        
4.   Mood pre-measure (i.e., not 
happy right now) 
-.68** -.77** -.73** -       
5.   Income .17* .01 .17* -.04 -      
6.   Implicit Theories i .05 .23** .08 -.19** -.09 -     
7.   Willingness to Sacrifice -.04 -.01 .01 -.02 -.03 .10 -    
8.   Importance of Present Goal .09 .11† .07 -.14* -.10 .11 -.20** -   
9.   Achieve Present Goal Certainty .13* .14* .10 -.15* -.06 .16* .07 .33** -  
10. Importance of Future Goal .05 .11† .06 -.05 -.11† -.06 .19** .21** .27** - 
11. Achieve Future Goal Certainty .29** .34** .27** -.23** -.05 .15* .16* .11† .37** .33** 
 
Note. ** p< .01, * p< .05, †p ≤ .10. 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 18 
 
Study 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Condition  
 
Measures 
Present Focus 
Condition 
Future Focus 
Condition 
Means (SD) Means (SD) 
Life Satisfaction (DV) 4.11a (1.50) 4.35a (1.42) 
Mood (positive) - DV 4.48a (1.68)  4.78a (1.63) 
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 7.04a (2.27) 7.55b (2.07) 
Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy right now) 3.23a (1.87) 2.90a (1.76) 
Income $55.63K a ($35K) $53.78K a ($32K) 
Implicit Theories of Personalityi 3.59a (1.19) 3.67a (1.22) 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future 4.32a (1.19) 4.36a (1.24) 
Importance of Present Goal 4.45a (1.62) 4.41a(1.65) 
Achieve Present Goal Certainty 5.73a (1.30) 5.84a (1.34) 
Importance of Future Goal 5.79a (1.34) 5.95a (1.32) 
Achieve Future Goal Certainty 5.29a (1.50) 5.43a (1.48) 
 
Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a marginal difference (p = .055). 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 19 
 
Study 3: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus), Implicit Theory of 
Personality and OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure. 
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Condition (present vs. future) -.01 -.37 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.01 .79 
OECD Life Satisfaction (LS) pre-measure .82 21.37** 
Step 2   
Condition (present vs. future) -.02 -.45 
Implicit Theory of Personality i -.01 -.25 
OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure .82 21.32** 
Condition X Implicit Theory .05 1.24 
Implicit Theory X OECD LS -.05 -1.28 
Condition X OECD LS .00 .09 
Step 3   
Condition (present vs. future) -.01 -.32 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .01 .12 
OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure .82 21.54** 
Condition X Implicit Theory .05 1.41 
Implicit Theory X OECD LS -.06 -1.57 
Condition X OECD LS .01 .31 
Implicit Theory X Condition X OECD LS -.08 -2.18* 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05  
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Table 20 
 
Study 3: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus) and Implicit Theory 
of Personality for the group initially low in Life Satisfaction 
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Condition (present vs. future) -.01 -.06 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .10 .96 
Step 2   
Condition (present vs. future) -.02 -.17 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .13 1.26 
Condition X Implicit Theory .22 2.18* 
 
Note.  Low in initial life satisfaction. 
 Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 *p = .03 
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Table 21 
 
Study 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Original Condition  
 
Measures 
Future Lack  
of Control 
Condition 
Future  
Baseline 
Condition 
Future 
Controllable 
Condition 
Means (SD) Means (SD) Means (SD) 
Life Satisfaction (DV) 3.94a (1.43) 4.04a (1.40) 4.23a (1.29) 
Mood (positive) – DV  4.23a (1.52) 4.86b (1.36) 4.57ab (1.45) 
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 7.00a (2.34) 7.35a (2.08) 7.42a (1.95) 
Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy 
right now) 
3.36a (1.69) 2.95a (1.63) 3.23a (1.69) 
Implicit Theories of Personalityi 3.50a (1.20) 3.54a (1.07) 3.59a (1.08) 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for 
Future 
4.62a (1.09) 4.79a (1.08) 4.63a (1.12) 
Importance of Present Goal 5.47a (1.49) 5.26ab (1.48) 5.03b (1.47) 
Importance of Future Goal 6.00a (1.21) 6.11a (1.11) 5.94 a (1.11) 
Specific goal certainty/controllability  5.20a (1.39) 5.18a (1.58) 5.43a (1.03) 
General future goal certainty 
composite 
4.58ab (1.13) 4.80a (1.06) 4.52b† (.86) 
 
Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference (p < .05). Subscripts with a † 
notation indicate a marginal difference (p ≤ .10). 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 22 
 
Study 4: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent Variables (overall) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.  Life Satisfaction - DV -         
2.  Mood (positive) - DV .68** -        
3.  Life Satisfaction pre-
measure  
.77** .68** -       
4.  Mood pre-measure (i.e., not 
happy right now) 
-.62** -.80** -.64** -      
5.  Implicit Theories i .15* .14* .13* -.09 -     
6.  Willingness to Sacrifice .20** .23** .20** -.23** .25** -    
7.  Importance of Present Goal .08 .09 .03 -.02 .18** .14* -   
8.  Importance of Future Goal .05 .12† .08 -.10 .15* .42** .36** -  
9.  Specific goal 
certainty/controllability 
.34** .36** .37** -.30** .13* .33** .17** .30** - 
10. General future goal 
certainty composite 
.43** .37** .39** -.29** .24* .37** .17** .24** .49** 
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p = .07. 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
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Table 23 
 
Study 4: Intercorrelations among Highlighted Variables (controlling for initial condition) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Life Satisfaction - DV -     
2.  Mood (positive) - DV .69**     
3.  Implicit Theories i .15* .13* -   
4.  Willingness to Sacrifice .20** .23** .25** -  
5.  Specific goal 
certainty/controllability 
.34** .35** .12† .33** - 
6.  General future goal  
     certainty composite 
.43** .37**   .27** .42** .54** 
 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p = .06 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
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Table 24 
 
Study 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Condition  
 
Measures 
Future Lack  
of Control 
Condition 
Future  
Baseline 
Condition 
Future 
Controllable 
Condition 
Means (SD) Means (SD) Means (SD) 
Life Satisfaction (DV) 4.15a (1.58) 4.25ab (1.55) 4.55b† (1.56) 
Mood (positive) - DV 4.47a (1.61) 4.55ab (1.65) 5.00c (1.57) 
Life Satisfaction pre-measure 7.11a (2.52) 7.14a (2.44) 7.42a (2.43) 
Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy right 
now) 
3.05a (1.90) 3.08 a (1.74) 2.73a (1.57) 
Implicit Theories of Personalityi 3.47a (1.09) 3.56a (1.13) 3.58a (1.21) 
Importance of Present Goal 5.36a (1.46) 5.35a (1.41) 5.03a (1.51) 
Importance of Future Goal 6.37ab (.85) 6.25a (.97) 6.44b† (.71) 
Goal Progress 5.08a (2.28) 4.28b (2.13) 4.87ac (2.03) 
Specific goal certainty/controllability 5.16a (1.27) 5.51b (1.37) 5.87c (1.09) 
General future goal certainty composite 4.45ac (1.03) 4.62a (1.12) 4.99b (1.02) 
Pessimism 3.80ac (1.20) 3.70a (1.19) 3.36b (1.21) 
Optimism 4.27a (1.41) 4.44ab (1.41) 4.70b (1.33) 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for 
Future 
4.72a (1.07) 4.75a (1.27) 5.00b† (1.13) 
One vs. many sacrifices k 3.81a (1.31) 3.71a (1.44) 3.91a (1.26) 
 
Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference (p < .05). Subscripts with a † 
notation indicate a marginal difference (p ≤ .10). 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
k Higher scores indicate many sacrifices. 
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Table 25 
 
Study 5: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent Variables (overall) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   11 12 13 
1.  Life Satisfaction - DV -             
2. Mood (positive) - DV .73** -            
3.  Life Satisfaction pre- 
     measure  
.83** .74** -           
4.  Mood pre-measure 
    (i.e., not happy right now) 
-.73** -.83** -.80** -          
5.  Implicit Theoriesi .13* .13* .09
†
 -.10
†
 -         
6.  Importance of Present 
     Goal 
.10 .07 .07 -.11* -.02 -        
7.  Importance of Future  
     Goal 
.03 .05 .03 -.10† -.07 .29** -       
8.  Goal progress .01 -.04 -.03 .07 -.07 -.05 .07 -      
9.  Specific goal certainty/  
     controllability 
.37** .38** .36** -.35** .04 .04 .22** .11* -     
10. General future goal  
      certainty composite 
.40** .43** .37** -.42** .14** .04 .16* -.03 .53** -    
11. Pessimism -.50** -.53** -.51** .53** -.18** -.12* -.18** .07 -.48** -.64** -   
12. Optimism .63** .63** .61** -.61 ** .23** .11* .10
†
 .02 .47** .57** -.70** -  
13. Willingness to Sacrifice .06 .11* .07** -.11* .08 .05 .23** -.06 .22** .31** -.35** .15** - 
14. One vs. Many  
      Sacrifices  
-.16** -.06 -.17** .11* .03 -.07 .15** -.07 -.12* -.11* .14* -.14* .07 
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p ≤ .10 
i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
k Higher scores indicate many sacrifices. 
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Table 26 
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (no control, baseline, control) and Implicit 
Theory of Personality. 
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable) .08 1.57 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .13 2.39* 
Step 2   
Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable) .08 1.58 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .12 2.32* 
Condition X Implicit Theories .06 1.06 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Lack of control = -1, baseline = 0 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 * p = .02 
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Table 27 
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable), Implicit 
Theory of Personality and OECD Life-Satisfaction pre-measure. 
 
Predictor β t 
Step 1   
Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable) .05 1.51 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .06 1.87 
OECD Life Satisfaction (LS) pre-measure .83 27.73** 
Step 2   
Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable) .05 1.53 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .05 1.80 
OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure .83 27.65** 
Condition X Implicit Theory .05 1.56 
Implicit Theory X OECD LS .02 51 
Condition X OECD LS -.03 -1.12 
Step 3   
Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable) .05 1.66† 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .06 1.83† 
OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure .82 27.56** 
Condition X Implicit Theory .05 1.61 
Implicit Theory X OECD LS .02 .71 
Condition X OECD LS -.04 -1.31 
Implicit Theory X Condition X OECD LS -.04 -1.36 
 
Note. Standardized coefficients. 
Effect coding for condition: Lack of control = -1, baseline = 0 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10 
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Table 28 
 
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (dummy coded) and Implicit Theory of 
Personality for the group initially low in Life Satisfaction 
Predictor β t 
Regression 1   
Step 1   
Dummy1.Base.Controllable .12 1.47 
Dummy2.Base.LackControl -.08 -.91 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .22 2.94** 
Step 2   
Dummy1.Base.Controllable .12 1.39 
Dummy2.Base.LackControl -.08 -.97 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .13 1.14 
Implicit Theory X Dummy1.B.C .20 2.00* 
Implicit Theory X Dummy2.Base.LC -.04 -.43 
   
Regression 2   
Step 1   
Dummy3.LackControl.Controllable .20 2.25* 
Dummy4.LackControl.Base .08 .91 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .221 2.94** 
Step 2   
Dummy3.LackControl.Controllable .20 2.25* 
Dummy4.LackControl.Base .09 .97 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .05 .36 
Implicit Theory X Dummy3.LC.C .24 2.20* 
Implicit Theory X Dummy4.LC.B .05 .43 
 
Note.  Low in initial life satisfaction 
 Standardized coefficients. 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 29 
 
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (dummy coded) and Implicit Theory of 
Personality for the group initially high in Life Satisfaction 
Predictor β t 
Regression 1   
Step 1   
Dummy1.Base.Controllable .10 1.17 
Dummy2.Base.LackControl .01 .14 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .17 2.25* 
Step 2   
Dummy1.Base.Controllable .10 1.23 
Dummy2.Base.LackControl .02 .19 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .23 1.78† 
Implicit Theory X Dummy1.B.C -.11 -.97 
Implicit Theory X Dummy2.Base.LC -.01 -.05 
   
Regression 2   
Step 1   
Dummy3.LackControl.Control .09 1.00 
Dummy4.LackControl.Base -.01 -.14 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .17 2.48* 
Step 2   
Dummy3.LackControl.Control .09 1.01 
Dummy4.LackControl.Base -.02 -.19 
Implicit Theory of Personality i .22 1.69† 
Implicit Theory X Dummy3.LC.C -.10 -.91 
Implicit Theory X Dummy4.LC.B .01 .05 
 
Note.  High in initial life satisfaction 
 Standardized coefficients. 
iHigher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory. 
 ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Figure 1. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and 
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the future 
  
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
Entity Incremental
O
EC
D
 L
if
e
 S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
Implicit Theory
Low Willing to
Sacrifice
High Willing to
Sacrifice
180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Regulatory 
Focus. 
  
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
Entity Incremental
O
EC
D
 L
if
e
 S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
Lo Promotion
Hi Promotion
181 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Present 
Hedonic Time Perspective. 
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Figure 4. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Future 
Focus Time Perspective. 
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Figure 5. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Present 
Fatalistic Time Perspective. 
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Figure 6. Study 2: Life Satisfaction Ratings (DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and 
Present versus Future Focus Manipulated Condition. 
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Figure 7. Study 2: Initial Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and 
Present versus Future Focus Manipulated Condition. 
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Figure 8. Study 3: For those initially high in Life Satisfaction – Life Satisfaction Ratings 
(DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and Present versus Future Focus Manipulated 
Condition. 
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Figure 9. Study 3: For those initially low in Life Satisfaction - Life Satisfaction Ratings (DV) 
as a function of Implicit Theories and Present versus Future Focus Manipulated Condition. 
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Figure 10. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that specific goal certainty/controllability 
mediates the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction (DV); 95% CI [.01, 
.13], p < .05.  
Implicit Theories 
Specific Goal 
Certainty/ 
Controllability 
Life  
Satisfaction 
b = .15 
(p = 
.05) 
b = .33 
(p < 
.001) 
c path   b = .18, (p = 
.03) 
c’ path   b = .13, (p = 
.10) 
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Figure 11. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that general goal certainty mediates the 
relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction (DV); 95% CI [.05, .22], p < .05.  
Implicit Theories 
General Goal 
Certainty 
Life  
Satisfaction 
b = .25 
(p < 
.001) 
b = .57 
(p < 
.001) 
c path   b = .18, (p = 
.02) 
c’ path   b = .04, (p = 
.61) 
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Figure 12. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that specific goal certainty/controllability 
mediates the relationship between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for 
the future; 95% CI [.01, .10], p < .05. 
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Figure 13. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that general goal certainty mediates the 
relationship between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; 
95% CI [.05, .19], p < .05. 
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Figure 14. Study 5: For those initially low in Life Satisfaction - Life Satisfaction Ratings 
(DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and Manipulated Condition. 
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Figure 15. Study 5: For those initially high in Life Satisfaction - Life Satisfaction Ratings 
(DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and Manipulated Condition. 
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Figure 16. Study 5: Histogram – the degree to which "sacrificing" the present represented 
a 'one time' sacrifice versus 'many sacrifices' over time. 
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